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LOCKE ON REPUTATION 
Tim Stuart-Buttle1,2 
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PERMISSION*** 
 
Abstract: Locke emphasised that a concern for reputation powerfully VKDSHGWKHLQGLYLGXDO·Vconduct. 
Most scholarship suggests that Locke portrayed this phenomenon in negative terms. This article 
complicates this picture. A FRQFHUQIRUUHSXWDWLRQVHUYHGDFRQVWUXFWLYHUROHLQ/RFNH·VWKHRU\RIVRFLal 
development, which offered a powerful alternative explanation of the origins of moral consensus and 
political authority to Hobbes·s. Locke nonetheless suggested that misunderstandings engendered in 
Christian commonwealths regarding the nature of political and religious authority had impacted 
negatively on the moral regulation of societies. The forces governing society, which once habituated 
individuals in beneficial ways, now led them astray.       
Keywords: law of nature, civil law, divine law, sovereignty, political obligation, conscience, toleration, 
moral obligation, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, atheism, Jesus Christ. 
 
In An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689), John Locke declared that ¶he who imagines 
Commendation and Disgrace, not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate themselves to the 
2SLQLRQVDQG5XOHVRIWKRVHZLWKZKRPWKH\FRQYHUVHVHHPVOLWWOHVNLOO·GLQWKH1DWXUHRU+LVWRU\RI
0DQNLQG·,WZDV ¶D%XUWKHQWRRKHDY\IRUKXPDQH6XIIHUDQFH· WR ¶OLYH LQ6RFLHW\XQGHUWKHFRQVWDQW
Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and thRVH KH FRQYHUVHV ZLWK· E 2.28.12).3 For Locke, the 
FRQFHUQ WR VHFXUH WKH JRRG RSLQLRQ RI RQH·V QHLJKERXUV ZDV among the most powerful of human 
GHVLUHVDQGSURIRXQGO\VKDSHGWKHLQGLYLGXDO·VVHQVHRIself. /RFNH·Vpersistent concern with how the 
individual is shaped by and through his4 interactions with others in society, as much recent scholarship 
has observed, casts doubt on the once-hegemonic interpretation of Locke as primarily ¶DSKLORVRSKHURI
                                                          
1  Research Associate, Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Cambridge, CB3 
9DT (email: ts630@cam.ac.uk).  
2  I would like to express my gratitude to Bob Harris, Richard Oosterhoff, John Robertson, Harry Smith, Lizzie Swann and 
seminar audiences in Antwerp, Cambridge and London for commenting on earlier versions of this essay, and to the 
MRXUQDO·VHGLWRUDQGtwo anonymous readers for their constructive criticisms. The research for this article was undertaken 
DV SDUW RI WKH SURMHFW ¶&URVVURDGV RI .QRZOHGJH LQ (DUO\ 0RGHUQ (QJODQG 7KH 3ODFH RI /LWHUDWXUH· IXQded by the 
European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme [(FP7/2007-2013)/ERC 
grant agreement no 617849].  
3  An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975). References are provided in brackets in the 
text, in the following format: Book, Chapter, Section. 
4  In his writings Locke does not employ gender-neutral language. For reasons of clarity I follow his practice, given that 
this article combines lengthy citation with extended textual exposition. 
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DWRPLVHG DQG DEVWUDFWHG LQGLYLGXDOV·.5 Few serious students would now DJUHH ZLWK -RKQ 3ODPHQDW]·V
sweeping statement that, in his writings, /RFNH ¶GRHV QRW WURXEOH WRHQTXLUHKRZ >LQGLYLGXDOV·] living 
together affects them psychologically and morally·6 Indeed, this verdict has been reversed by Hannah 
Dawson. ¶)DUIURPFRQWUROOLQJFXOWXUH·she VXJJHVWVRQ/RFNH·VDFFRXQW¶LQGLYLGXDOVGUDZEUHDWKIURP
LW·7  
On the one hand, Locke emphasised the cognitive and ethical autonomy required for selfhood, political 
judgement and (most importantly) salvation. On the other, he was acutely sensitive to the dynamic 
shaping of the human personality by conventional practices of social discipline and linguistic usage as 
inculcated through education, habit and repetition. Much stimulating scholarship has focused on 
precisely this WHQVLRQ LQ /RFNH·V WKRXJKW. Consequently, Locke has emerged as a rather more 
¶HTXLYRFDO· ¶DPELYDOHQW· ¶DQ[LRXV· DQG ¶disturbing· ILJXUH LQ WKHKLVWRU\RISKLORVRSK\ WKDQZDVRQFH
suspected ² courageously (or foolishly) raising unsettling questions and far-reaching doubts, but 
XQZLOOLQJRUXQDEOHWRRIIHUDQ\¶HDV\VROXWLRQV·WRWKHP.8 This more sceptical Locke was also keenly 
aware of the creative, constitutive power of language ² which in part explains his declared hostility to 
the arts of rhetoric and eloquence as powerful tools of deception (EHU 3.10.34). Locke, however, was 
no stranger to those arts.9 7KHSHGDJRJLFDOWRQHDQGLQWHQWRI/RFNH·VZULWLQJVRQHGXFDWLRQKDYHEHHQ
                                                          
5 7KHSKUDVH LV -DPHV7XOO\·V A Discourse on Property: Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980), p. 24. The canonical 
interpretations in this regard ² notwithstanding their significant divergences ² are C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of 
Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962); and L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), pp. 202-51.   
6 J. Plamenatz, Man and Society: Political and Social Theories from Machiavelli to Marx [1963], rvd edn (3 vols., London, 1992), i, 
p. 344.  
7 H. Dawson, Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge, 2007), p. 297. 
8 The adjectives are drawn, respectively, from K.M. McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent 
(London, 1996) S  - 'XQQ ¶´%ULJKW (QRXJK )RU $OO 2XU 3XUSRVHVµ -RKQ /RFNH·V &onception of a Civilised 
SRFLHW\·Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 43 (1989), pp. 133-53 (on p. 153); U.S. Singh, The Anxiety of Freedom: 
,PDJLQDWLRQDQG,QGLYLGXDOLW\LQ/RFNH·V3ROLWLFDO7KRXJKW (London, 1992)*6FKRFKHW¶7ROHUDWLRQ5HYROXWLRQDQG-XGJPHQW
in the DHYHORSPHQWRI/RFNH·V Political TKRXJKW·Political Science, 40:1 (1988), pp. 84-96 (on p. 95); and Dawson, Locke, 
Language, p. 276.   
9  )RU/RFNH·V DSSUHFLDWLRQRI WKHFUHDWLYHSRZHURI ODQJXDJe, see Dawson, Locke, Language, pp. 239-76; K.M. McClure, 
¶&DWR·V5etreat: Fabula, Historia, and the Question of CoQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLQ0U/RFNH·V$nonymous Essay on GovernmenW·
in K. Sharpe & S.N. Zwicker (eds.), Reading, Society and Politics in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 317-50; and 
T. Shanks, $XWKRULW\)LJXUHV5KHWRULFDQG([SHULHQFHLQ-RKQ/RFNH·V3ROLWLFDO7KRXJKW (Pennsylvania, 2014). 
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identified and foregrounded in recent readings of his epistemological, religious and political works.10 
Locke sought to cultivate his reader, and to encourage them to exercise their judgement on questions 
which ought to be of greatest concern to them as members of political and religious societies founded 
theoretically upon their voluntary consent and kept in check solely by their vigilance and capacity for 
informed critique. /RFNH ZH DUH WROG DLPHG WR LQWURGXFH D QHZ ¶UHDVRQDEOH· ODQJXDJH RI SROLWLFDO
justification founded upon probability. Precisely because Locke recognised the manner in which 
individuals are insensibly shaped by the societies in which they live ² and the authoritative institutions 
dominant within them ² any such reform had to be cultural as well as political.11  
This article builds upon this recent body of Locke scholarship. The interpretation offered nonetheless 
diverges from it in significant ways, by focusing more directly RQ/RFNH·VWUHDWPHQWRIPDQ·VGHVLUHIRU
esteem and reputation. The current literature touches on this theme only in passing. Scholars continue 
to VXJJHVW WKDWE\DQG ODUJH/RFNHFRQVLGHUHG WKH LQGLYLGXDO·VSHUYDVLYHFRQFHUQIRU esteem to be a 
negative characteristic of human nature. It allowed false (or at least unverifiable) opinions to be foisted 
on the indivLGXDO·V PLQG IURP FKLOGKRod. For this reason Locke exhorted the individual to ¶UHPDNH
himself E\ PHWKRGRORJLFDO DQG GLVFLSOLQHG DFWLRQ· DQG WKHUHE\ WR reclaim his cognitive autonomy.12 
Reason and custom were in conflict for almost all individuals, who had not been fortunate enough to 
have been HGXFDWHGDFFRUGLQJWR/RFNH·VEOXHSULQW13 IQVRIDUDV/RFNHUHFRQFHSWXDOLVHGPHQ·VFRQFHUQ
for reputation in more constructive and positive ways, indeed, he did so in his educational theory, 
advising parents to strengthen and manipulate their chiOG·VFRQFHUQIRUSUDLVHDQGDYHUVLRQWREODPHDV
                                                          
10  See especially M. Button, Contract, Culture, and Citizenship: Transformative Liberalism from Hobbes to Rawls (Pennsylvania, 
2009), pp. 87-172; S. Corneanu, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (London, 
2011), pp. 141-68; R. Grant, -RKQ /RFNH·V /LEHUDOLVP (Chicago, 1987); N. Tarcov, /RFNH·V (GXFDWLRQ IRU /LEerty (Chicago, 
1984); and L. Ward, John Locke and Modern Life (Cambridge, 2010). 
11  D. Casson, /LEHUDWLQJ -XGJPHQW )DQDWLFV 6NHSWLFV DQG -RKQ /RFNH·V 3ROLWLFV RI 3UREDELOLW\ (Princeton, 2011); and J. Smith, 
¶&XVWRP$VVRFLDWLRQDQGWKH0L[HG0RGH/RFNH·V(DUO\7KHRU\RI&XOWXUDO5HSURGXFWLRQ·English Literary History, 73:4 
(2006), pp. 831-53. 
12  C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA, 1989), pp. 159-76 (on p. 159). 
13  R. *UDQW ¶-RKQ/RFNHRQ&XVWRP·V3RZHUDQG5HDVRQ·V$XWKRULW\·The Review of Politics, 74 (2012), pp. 607-29. For a 
long durée account of (largely negative) depictions of custom in the western philosophical tradition, cf. D.R. Kelley, 
¶´Altera Naturaµ: The Idea of Custom in Historical PerspectivH· LQ - +HQU\ 	 6 +XWWRQ HGV New Perspectives on 
Renaissance Thought (London, 1990), pp. 83-100. 
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a means to habituate them to virtuous conduct.14 <HWDVWKLVLPSOLHVWRJRYHUQRQH·VFRQGXFWRXWRID
FRQFHUQ IRU RQH·V UHSXWDWLRQ ZDV MXYHQLOH RQH RQO\ HPEUDFHG RQH·V KXPDQLW\ DQG EHFDPH DQ
autonomous morDODJHQWZKHQRQHUHFRJQLVHGRQH·VDFFRXQWDELOLW\EHIRUHDWUDQVFHQGHQWPRUDOODZRI
divine origin. 
There is much truth to this. Locke does indeed urge his reader to wage war against the effects of 
education, custom and fashion, which have inculcated a wa\ RI WKLQNLQJ ¶RUWKRGR[\· WKDW VXSSRUWV
existing, often illegitimate structures of social power and cultural authority. Myriad passages from 
/RFNH·VHGXFDWLRQDODQGHSLVWHPRORJLFDOZULWLQJVFRXOGEHDGGXFHGWRVXEVWDQWLDWHWKLVFODLP/RFNH·V
revisions to the Essay ² notably his account of personal identity (EHU 2.21), free will (EHU 2.27), the 
association of ideas as a theory which explained epistemological error and ingrained prejudice (EHU 
2.33), and Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1706) ² further support the point.15 As I hope to show, 
however, this is not the whole story. /RFNH ZDV SURIRXQGO\ SHVVLPLVWLF DERXW WKH LQGLYLGXDO·V
willingness and ability to detach himself IURP VRFLHW\ LQ RUGHU WR FXOWLYDWH D ¶ORYH RI 7UXWK· DQG
¶LQGLIIHUHQF\· IRU WKH opinions of others.16 Paradoxical though it may appear, this pessimism was a 
necessary consequence of the highly constructive, explanatory role Locke accorded to an all-pervasive 
GHVLUH IRU WKHJRRGRSLQLRQRIRQH·VSHHUV LQKLVDFFRXQWRI WKHRULJLQVDQGGevelopment of society. 
Here /RFNH·V PRUDO WKLQNLQJ ZDV DW LWV PRVW QRYHO VWLPXODWLQJ ² and, for contemporaries, most 
troubling.  
If we are to grasp this point, we need first to recognise that Locke was as concerned as his 
cRQWHPSRUDULHVE\7KRPDV+REEHV·s startling account of the origins of society and human fellowship. 
From early on, Locke was preoccupied by the question of how men might arrive at knowledge of a 
                                                          
14  M.(%UDG\¶/RFNH·VThoughts on RHSXWDWLRQ·The Review of Politics, 75 (2013), pp. 335-56; I. Harris, The Mind of John Locke 
(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 280-89; Tarcov, Education for Liberty, pp. 96- DQG WKH HGLWRUV· LQWURGXFWLRQ WR/RFNH Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, ed. J.W. Yolton & J.S. Yolton (Oxford, 1989).  
15  The first two of these chapters were added to the second edition of 1694, and the third to the fourth edition of 1700. 
The Conduct was initially intended for the EssayDQGZRXOGKDYHPDGH¶WKHODUJHVWFKDSWHU·LQWKHZRUN/RFNHWR:LOOLDP
Molyneux, April 1697, in The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E.S. de Beer (8 vols., Oxford, 1976-89), vi, #2243. 
16  Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1706), in The Works of John Locke (9 vols., London, 1794; repr. London, 1997), ii, p. 384. 
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shared standard of moral good and ill without the need for magisterial imposition.17 This task was made 
FRQVLGHUDEO\ PRUH WD[LQJ E\ /RFNH·V RZQ WKRURXJKJRLQJ GHQLDO RI LQQDWH LGHDV RU PDQ·V QDWXUDO
predisposition to the good, and embrace of sense-HPSLULFLVP0HQ·VFRQFHUQIRUUHSXWDWLRQthis essay 
contends SOD\V D FHQWUDO UROH LQ /RFNH·V GHHSO\ SUoblematic attempt to do so. In his writings ² 
including his private papers ² Locke gestures towards a more naturalistic account of how individuals 
acquire moral knowledge, and a sense of moral obligation, by living together in society.18 0HQ·VFRQFHUQ
for reputation offered a powerful means of explaining how mutual co-operation ² and hence the 
establishment of some degree of consensus as to right and wrong, good and ill ² had been possible 
prior to government, which consequently remained accountable to this pre-existing moral community. 
For Locke the desire for esteem potentially served a beneficial purpose: it allowed individuals, driven to 
judge and act largely by their self-regarding passions, nonetheless to take pleasure in actively assisting 
(and pleasing) others. In other words, a concern for reputation facilitated a harmony between private 
interest and the interests of the community without the neHG IRU +REEHV·V /HYLDWKDQ VWDWH ,n this 
UHJDUG/RFNHXQOLNH+REEHVVWXEERUQO\UHIXVHGWRUHGXFHWKH¶VRFLaO·WRWKH¶SROLWLFDO·.19 Furthermore, 
Locke understood this process in providential and teleological terms: meQ·V GHVLUH IRU HVWHHP DQ
ineffaceable part of their created nature, helped to lead them to perform their duties as enshrined in the 
(divinely-ordained) law of nature. 
This is certainly not to claim that Locke was willing to accept that morality had its origins in human 
convention and utility. This was, indeed, a claim he was determined to overthrow throughout his life, 
by arguing that genuine morality has an authority antecedent to political society and independent of its 
social utility. The communal, manmade ideas of good and ill which developed on the basis of their 
                                                          
17  $V.LUVWLH0F&OXUHQRWHV/RFNHUHSKUDVHG¶WKHTXHVWLRQRIQDWXUDOODZDVDTXHVWLRQRIHSLVWHPRORJ\·Judging Rights, p. 
39). 
18  )RUDFRPSOHPHQWDU\GLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVSRLQWVHH+'DZVRQ¶1DWXUDO5eligion: Pufendorf and Locke on the Edge of 
Freedom and RHDVRQ·LQ46NLQQHU	09DQ*HOGHUHQHGVFreedom and the Construction of Europe (Cambridge, 2013), 
pp. 115-33. 
19  This contrasts with broadly Straussian readings of Locke as a disciple of Hobbes. See, for one example, Richard H. 
&R[·VFODLPWKDWLQ/RFNH¶WKH´SROLWLFDOµ is essentialO\SULPDU\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH´VRFLDOµ·DV¶the latter is subsumed 
under the former and is the product of it, a proposition which is by no means surprizing once it is realized that Locke in 
IDFWGHQLHVWKHQDWXUDOVRFLDELOLW\RIPDQ·: Locke on War and Peace (Oxford, 1960), p. 115. 
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public utility were not in themselves in any meaningful sense moral or obligatory: only if they accorded 
with the will and command of the divine legislator ² and were recognised to do so ² might they acquire 
this status. Locke was, in short, no pagan ethical naturalist: he furnished a fully-articulated moral 
theology, and laboured the point that, if God were removed from the equation, it would be impossible to 
offer a moral theory worthy of the name. <HW /RFNH·V HPSKDVLV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ PHQ·V
desire for esteem and their (potentially beneficial) habituation in virtue in society remains an 
unmistakeable, innovative and largely neglected aspect of his thinking, and one that rewards closer 
analysis. There is also evidence to indicate that it was recognised as such by later philosophers, notably 
David Hume ² even if he ripped Locke·VLQVLJKWVIURPWKHWKHRFHQWULFWHOHRORJLFDOIUDPHZRUNLQZKLFK
Locke himself had placed them. 
The first section RIWKLVDUWLFOHZLOOH[DPLQHWKHQDWXUHRI+REEHV·s challenge. The second explores how 
a (largely beneficial) concern for reputation occupies DFUXFLDOSODFHLQ/RFNH·VDOWHUQDWLYHH[SODQDWLRQ
of the origins and development of society. Yet there is a sting in the tail. The third section will explain 
why, for Locke, since the Christianisation of the Roman Empire a concern for reputation had largely 
ceased to play its positive function in guiding the individual into the path of virtue. Locke, in other 
words, offers a story of how reason and custom had come to be in conflict ² something which had not 
previously been the case to the same extent ² laUJHO\ RQ DFFRXQW RI WKH &KULVWLDQ PDJLVWUDWH·V
fundamentally misplaced desire to impose ¶WUXH· VSHFXODWLYH PRUDO DQG UHOLJLRXV RSLQLRQV RQ KLV
subjects. This had impacted negatively on the moral regulation of societies, and here the close 
relationship betwHHQ/RFNH·VZULWLQJVRIWKHVLVIRUHJURXQGHGWKHEssay, Treatises and Epistola de 
Tolerantia. 7KLV LQ SDUW H[SODLQV WKH DJRQLVHG VWUDLQ RI /RFNH·V UHSHDWHG FDOO IRU LQGLYLGXDOV LQ
specifically Christian societies to free themselves from the opinions imposed upon them through 
education, custom and fashion ² and his pessimism that they would be willing or able to do so. It also 
explains why scholars have found plenty of evidence to support the claim that Locke conceived of 
PHQ·V GHVLUH IRU HVWHHP LQ Qegative terms: in societies in which the ecclesiastical and civil were 
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LQWHUPL[HGVXFKDV/RFNH·V(QJODQGWKHHIIHFWVRI¶IDVKLRQ·DQG¶FXVWRP·had indeed been dire. The 
final section will offer some concluding remarks, which indicate how the recovery oI/RFNH·VSRZHUIXO
\HWFRPSOH[HYDOXDWLRQRIPHQ·VFRQFHUQIRUUHSXWDWLRQ and its relationship to moral conduct further 
reinforces the insight RIUHFHQWVFKRODUVWKDW/RFNH·V intellectual bequest to the eighteenth century was 
as stimulating as it was ambivalent.  
I 
/RFNH·VFODLP in 1697 that he had not read Hobbes with any degree of attention, and was unfamiliar 
with the arguments to be found in Leviathan, must be taken with a large pinch of salt.20 /RFNH·VHDUOLHVW
writings ² the ¶7ZR7UDFWVRQ*RYHUQPHQW·(c.1660-2) and his lectures on the law of nature (c.1663-4) ² 
evince a familiarity both ZLWK+REEHV·s arguments and with those of critics who had recently sought to 
formulate responses.21 This is unsurprising. /RFNH·VFLUFOHRIDFTXDLQWDQFHVDW2[IRUGVXFK as Gabriel 
Towerson and Robert Boyle, was deeply concerned to challenge the conclusions drawn by Hobbes 
from basic philosophical and theological premises which were broadly shared.22 In late 1660 we find 
Locke exchanging papers with Towerson, fellow of All Souls, on the question which had been set 
centre-stage by the internecine strife which had plagued England from the 1640s, and which Hobbes 
had addressed in distinctive and troubling fashion: that of the foundations of the moral consensus 
                                                          
20 A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity (1697), in Works, vi, pp. 421-3. /RFNH·VFODLPKDV LPSOLFLWO\EHHQ
endorsed by commentators who, contra Strauss et al., have denied that Locke engaged directly with Hobbes at any point: 
3 /DVOHWW ¶,QWURGXFWLRQ· WR Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 67-92. For a balanced 
reassessment of the Hobbes-Locke relationship, see Harris, Mind of Locke, pp. 4, 83-92; and 76WDQWRQ ¶+REEHVDQG
/RFNHRQ1DWXUDO/DZDQG-HVXV&KULVW·History of Political Thought, 29:1 (2008), pp. 65-88. 
21  /RFNH FLUFXODWHG KLV ¶7UDFWV· DQG OHFWXUHV LQ PDQXVFULSW DPRQJ DFTXDLQWDQFHV EXW WKH\ UHPDLQHG XQSXEOLVKHG LQ KLV
lifetime: Two Tracts on Government, ed. P. Abrams (Cambridge, 1967); and Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. W. von Leyden 
(Oxford, 1954) [hereafter ELN]. 
22  J. Parkin, Taming the Leviathan. The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700 
(Cambridge, 2007), pp. 200-237. This was also true for the Royal Society, to which Locke was elected in 1668: N. 
0DOFROP¶+REEHVDQGWKH5R\DO6RFLHW\·LQ*$-5RJHUV	$5\DQHGVPerspectives on Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 1988), 
pp. 43-66. 
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which was a precondition for all civil peace and order.23 This was a question which continued to 
preoccupy Locke throughout his life.24 
Hobbes argued that, because the individual·V LGHDV of what was good or true were dictated by self-
interest (what caused pleasure or pain) and custom (the teachings of self-interested others), consensus 
and mutual co-operation were impossible in the absence of undivided political authority. Reason did 
not afford man privileged access to a law of nature, which enshrined universally-obligatory, normative 
moral truths and provided the basis for social consensus. ¶2IGRFWULQHVWKDWGLVSRVHPHQWRVHGLWLRQ·
Hobbes declared in De Cive (1642), ¶the first, without question is: that knowledge of good or evil is a matter for 
individuals·25 Society and civil peace were only possible once men recognised their duty to submit their 
SULYDWH MXGJPHQW WR WKDW RI ¶WKH SXEOLTXH &RQVFLHQFH· WKDW LV RQFH WKH\ VXUUHQGHUHG WKHLU FODLP WR
identify moral and religious truths for themselves and submitted to the sovereign.26 Hobbes argued that 
PDQNLQGE\UHDVRQDORQHFRXOGNQRZRQO\RI*RG·VRPQLSRWHQFHQRWRI+LVDWWULEXWHVRUZLOO WKH
¶OLJKW RI 1DWXUH· ZDV VLOHQW RQ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI HWHUQDO VDQFWLRQV27 As Hobbes famously declared in 
Leviathan (1651) ¶*RGKDVQR(QGV· LQDYHU\UHDOVHQVHPDQNLQGKDGEHHQ OHIW WR LWVRZQGHYLFHV28 
/DZH[SUHVVLQJ LQDFOHDUDQGFRPSUHKHQVLEOHPDQQHUWKH ¶ZLOO·RIDVXSHULRUSRVVHVVHGRIDWWULEXWHV
which entitled him to command others, FRXOG RQO\ GHULYH IURP WKH ¶PRUWDO *RG· WKH VRvereign). 
Consequently natural law, as with all laws, could only be said to have acquired legislative status ² that is, 
it only gained its obligatory force ² when promulgated ¶by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will·
by the magistrate and accompanied by the sanctions of the civil law. In the absence of sovereign 
                                                          
23  See letters 104, 106, 115 and 118 (Oct. 1660-Apr. 1661) in Correspondence of Locke, i. For /RFNH·VH[FKDQJHZLWK7RZHUVRQ
DQGDGLVFXVVLRQRI/RFNH·VVXEVHTXHQWOHFWXUHVVHH+DUULVMind of Locke, pp. 75-107.  
24  G. Forster, -RKQ/RFNH·V3ROLWLFVRI0RUDO&RQVHQVXV (Cambridge, 2005). 
25  De Cive, ed. R. Tuck & trans. M. Silverthorne (Cambridge, 1998), [Ch.] 12. [Para.] 1, p. 131.  
26  Leviathan, ed. N. Malcolm (3 vols., Oxford, 2012), ii, 2.29, p. 502. 
27  Leviathan LL S ¶7KH5LJKWRI1DWXUHZKHUHE\*RGUHLJQHWKRYHUPHQDQGSXQLVKHWK WKRVH WKDWEUHDNKLV
Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but 
from his Irresistable Power >«@ 7R WKRVH WKHUHIRUH ZKRVH 3RZHU LV LUUHVLVWLEOH WKH GRPLQLRQ RI DOO PHQ DGKDHUHWK
naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the 
Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as 
2PQLSRWHQW· 
28  Ibid., ii. 2.31, pp. 554-74 (on p. 564). 
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authority, there was no law: ¶MXVW· DQG ¶XQMXVW· ORVW DOO PHDQLQJ DQG PHQ·V LGHDV RI right and wrong 
remained irretrievably subjective and mutually-contradictory.29  
There is every reDVRQWRVXJJHVWWKDW/RFNHODUJHO\DFFHSWHGDQXPEHURI+REEHV·s most fundamental 
insights ² many of which, it should be said, were by no means unique to Hobbes.30 /RFNH·V HDUOLHVW
correspondence betrays an unmistakeable pessimism regarding the human condition.31 ,Q WKH ¶7ZR
7UDFWV·/RFNHGUHZVLPLODUFRQFOXVLRQVWR+REEHVIURPWKHVHLQVLJKWVLQWRKXPDQSV\FKRORJ\ZKHQ it 
came to political and religious authority. 7KH¶LQWHUHVWVRIERWKSXEOLFSHDFHDQGWKHJURZWKDQGGLJQLW\
RI UHOLJLRQ· /RFNH DUJXHG FRXOd only be secured by a prudent, caring, but ultimately unaccountable 
sovereign and a trusting and obedient citizenship.32 The civil magistrate was no less fallible than his 
subjects when it came to identifying moral and religious truth. Yet he alone was able to provide an 
authoritative standard of good and ill, sacred and profane by which all of his subjects could agree to 
abide.33 Locke shared a stridently voluntarist conception of law with Hobbes and others whom he read 
at this time, such as Robert Sanderson: law was the explicit command and will of a superior whose 
known attributes entitled him to govern.34 
/RFNH·V OHFWXUHVRQ WKH ODZRIQDWXUH GHOLYHUHG DV&HQVRURI 0RUDO3KLORVRSK\ DW&KULVW&KXUFK LQ
1663-4, indicate that he similarly recognised the acuiW\RIRQHRI+REEHV·VFHQWUDOFRQWHQWLRQVQDWXUDO
law theorists had failed to establish the grounds of moral obligation. Locke rejected wholesale the 
                                                          
29  Ibid., ii, 2.26, pp. 414-HVSS¶)RUWKRXJKLWEHQDWXUDOO\UHDVRQDEOH\HWLWLVE\WKH6RYHUDLJQH3RZHUWKDWLWLV
/DZ2WKHUZLVHLWZHUHDJUHDWHUURXUWRFDOOWKH/DZHVRI1DWXUHXQZULWWHQ/DZ·)RUGLVFXVVLRQ'8QGHUVUXG¶2Q
Natural Law and Civil LDZLQWKH3ROLWLFDO3KLORVRSK\RI+REEHV·History of Political Thought, 35:4 (2014), pp. 683-716. 
30  Hobbes was familiar with the sceptical writings of Montaigne, Charron and Gassendi (among others), which similarly 
developed a hedonic account of human psychology and emphasised the diversity of moral practice. On moral scepticism 
in this period, see R.H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, rvd edn (Oxford, 2003); and R. Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge, 1993). FoU/RFNH·VSRVVLEOHHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHVHWKLQNHUVVHHPolitical 
Writings, ed. D. Wootton (Indianapolis, 1993), pp. 26-36; and D. Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity 
in the Enlightenment and Beyond (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 34-68.   
31  See, for example, /RFNHWR¶7RP·2FWLQCorrespondence of Locke, i, pp. 122-'H%HHULGHQWLILHGWKH¶7RP·LQ
question as Thomas Westrowe, who had studied at Christ Church with Locke in the 1650s, but the evidence for this 
attribution is limited. 
32  ¶6HFRQG7UDFWRQ*RYHUQPHQW·c.1662), in Two Tracts, p. 218. 
33  The fallibility of the magistrate is discussed in a Latin manuscript of c.1661-2 denying the need for (or existence of) an 
infallible interpreter of Scripture ² whether the Pope or the civil magistrate: PRO, Shaftesbury Papers, 30/24/47/33.  
34  )RU/RFNH·VGHEWWR6DQGHUVRQ·VDe Obligatione Conscientiae VHH$EUDP·VGLVFXVVLRQLQTwo Tracts, pp. 70-80.  
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arguments conventionally employed by natural lawyers to establish obligation: the doctrines of innate 
ideas and natural sociability, and the argument from universal consent /RFNH·V OHFWXUHV EHWUD\ KLV
extensive reading of travel literature, which indicated the sheer diversity of the moral and religious ideas 
and practices entertained by different societies (ELN, 160-79).35 From this point onwards, Locke 
DGRSWHG DQ HPSLULFLVWSRVLWLRQRQNQRZOHGJH DFTXLVLWLRQ7KH ¶VRXOV· RIPHQZHUH ¶HPSW\ WDEOHWV· DW
ELUWK ZKLFK ZHUH DIWHUZDUGV ¶WR EH ILOOHG LQ E\ REVHUYDWLRQ DQG UHDVRQLQJ· RQ WKH GDWD RI VHQVH-
experience (ELN 137).36  
/RFNH·V OHFWXUHVQRQHWKHOHVV LQGLFDWH LPSRUWDQWGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK+REEHVDQG LQWKLVUHVSHFW/RFNH
GHSDUWHG VLJQLILFDQWO\ IURP KLV SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH ¶7UDFWV· Locke maintained that the law of nature 
enshrined eternal moral precepts which, obligatory on all mankind, were in principle accessible to every 
individual. This claim rested on the assumption that reason was sufficient to establish the legislative 
capacity and will of God (HLV¶(QGV·² and the gratitude owed to him by His creatures ² rather than 
merely His existence and power.37 +HUH /RFNH RSHQHG XS D KRUQHW·V QHVW RI WKRUQ\ HSLVWHPRORJLFDO
questions which ultimately led him to a full-scale examination of the reach (and limits) of human 
understanding in the Essay/RFNH·VFKDOOHQJHZDVWRSUove what Hobbes deemed to be impossible: that 
man could acquire sufficient knowledge of the content and obligatory force of a law of nature of divine 
RULJLQZLWKRXW WKHQHHGIRU+REEHV·V ¶PRUWDO*RG·)RU/RFNHPDQ·VXOWLPDWHDFFRXQWDELOLW\ZDV WR
his Creator. Locke now adopted a position which he would develop in all of his subsequent writings: 
the individual had to employ his ¶labour· to acquire knowledge of natural law, which alone might offer 
QRUPDWLYH¶UXOHVE\ZKLFKWROLYH·7KLVUHTXLUHGWKHFULWLFDOHYDOXDWLRQRIWKRVH¶RSLQLRQV>ZKLFK@KDYH
FUHSWLQWRRXUPLQGVZLWKEXWOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQRQRXUSDUW·ELN, 143). ,Q/RFNH·VILQDOOHFWXUHKHQRWHG
WKDW¶WKHULJKWQHVVRIDQDFWLRQGRHVQRWGHSHQGRQLWVXWLOLW\RQWKHFRQWUDU\LWVXWLOLW\LVDUHVult of its 
                                                          
35  Carey, Contesting Diversity, pp. 34-68. 
36 J. ColPDQ ¶/RFNH·V (PSLULFLVW 7KHRU\ RI WKH /DZ RI 1DWXUH· LQ 35 $QVWH\ HG The Philosophy of John Locke: New 
Perspectives (London, 2003), pp. 106-26; Harris, Mind of Locke, pp. 81-2; and J.W. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas 
(Oxford, 1956). 
37  M. Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology (2 vols., London, 1991), ii, pp. 192-3 & n. 124, observes that Locke sought to 
UHMHFW+REEHV·VSRVLWLRQRQWKLVIXQGDPHQWDOSRLQW 
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ULJKWQHVV·ELN, 215). This claim ² whatever is useful is so because of its accordance with truth, not 
vice versa ² KLQWVDWWKHWHOHRORJLFDOGLPHQVLRQRI/RFNH·VWKLQNLQJZKLFKZRXOGEHFRPHPRUHDSSDUHQW
when he returned to this point in the Essay. As can be seen by turning our attentions to the Essay, 
¶XWLOLW\·QRQHWKHOHVVRFFXSLHVDFUXFLDOSODFHLQ/RFNH·VDWWHPSWWRRIIHUDPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHUHVSRQVH
to Hobbes on the origins of moral consensus and political authority, and on the relationship between 
human and divine (natural) law.  
II 
At the outset of the Essay /RFNH LGHQWLILHG ¶three Sorts· RI ¶Moral Rules RU /DZV· WKDW KDG EHHQ
HVWDEOLVKHGE\SKLORVRSKHUVWRH[SODLQPHQ·VVHQVHRIREOLJDWLRQWRDGKHUHWRFRPSDFWV38  (DFK¶/DZ·
was accompanied by its own sanctions. The first, and for Locke the only true law was that of the 
Christian: God required it of His created beings, and would hold the individual accountable for his 
moral actions on the Day of Judgment. The second law was that of the ¶+REELVW·¶EHFDXVHWKH3XEOLFN
requires it, and the Leviathan ZLOOSXQLVK\RX LI\RXGRQRW·7KH WKLUG ODZZDVSURYLGHGE\ ¶WKHROG
Heathen SKLORVRSKHUV·PRVWQRWDEO\WKH6WRLFVZKRDUJXHGWKDW WRGRVRZDVKRQHVWDQGVXLWDEOHWR
the dignity and perfection of a rational creature (EHU 7KHILUVWUXOHZDVGHQRPLQDWHG¶WKHDivine 
/DZ· DQG FRQFHUQHG LWVHOI ZLWK VLQ DQG GXW\ WKH VHFRQG ¶WKH Civil /DZ· GHPDUFDWLQJ FULPHV DQG
LQQRFHQFH DQG WKH WKLUG ZDVRULJLQDOO\ WHUPHGE\/RFNH ¶WKH philosophical /DZ· EXW IURP WKH VHFRQG
HGLWLRQZDVUHQDPHGWKH¶/DZRIOpinion or Reputation·DQGZDVSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKYLUWXHDQGYLFH
(EHU 2.28.7-10).  
7KHVDQFWLRQVHQIRUFLQJWKH¶/DZRIReputation·ZHUHSUDLVHDQGEODPH7KHVHZHUHLQSUDFWLFHWKHPRVW
poZHUIXORIDOO LQVKDSLQJPHQ·VFRQGXFW5HJUHWWDEO\ IHZLQGLYLGXDOV UHIOHFWHGXSRQ*RG·V ODZVDQG
WKH WHUULEOH SXQLVKPHQWV RI D IXWXUH VWDWH (YHQ WKRVH ZKR GLG PLJKW ¶HQWHUWDLQ 7KRXJKWV RI IXWXUH
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGPDNLQJWKHLU3HDFHIRUVXFK%UHDFKHV·Meanwhile, in some countries men entirely 
                                                          
38 )RUDQHDUOLHUGLVFXVVLRQRI WKLV WULSDUWLWHFRQFHSWLRQRI ODZ VHH WKH/DWLQPDQXVFULSWHQWLWOHG ¶/H[7ULSOH[·Bodleian 
Library, MS Locke f.3, p. 201 (15 July 1678).  
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lacked any idea of God ² so these admittedly primitive communities were clearly regulated by an 
alternative rule. :KHQ LW FDPH WR ¶WKH Civil /DZ· XSRQ ZKLFK +REEHV SODFHG VXFK weight, Locke 
stressed its limited reach, and noted that men ¶IUHTXHQWO\ IODWWHU WKHPVHOYHV ZLWK WKH KRSHV RI
,PSXQLW\·7KHUHDFKDQGSRZHURI WKH ¶/DZRIReputation· was infinitely greater: ¶QR0DQVFDSHV WKH
Punishment of Censure and Dislike, who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he 
NHHSV DQG ZRXOG UHFRPPHQG KLPVHOI WR· Few could bear the burden of living in disrepute (EHU 
2.28.12). 
A number of scholDUVKDYHGLVFXVVHG/RFNH·V WKUHH ¶/DZV·, and noted the emphasis he placed on the 
HIILFDF\ RI WKH ¶/DZ RI Reputation·.39 LoFNH·V LQQRYDWLRQ James 7XOO\ VXJJHVWV ZDV WR ¶WUDQVODWH
humanism, its virtues and vices and motives of honour, praise, glory and reputation, into his juridical 
IUDPHZRUN·. 7XOO\VXJJHVWVWKDWQRSDUDOOHOWRWKLV¶UHPDUNDEOHFRQFHSWXDOLQQRYDWLRQ·FDQEHfound in 
the seventeenth century. This supports his overall argument that Locke was a leading architect of the 
PRGHUQ FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO ¶VHOI· DV WKH SURGXFW RI DVVLGXRXV VHOI-discipline on pain of 
external disapproval (if also, for Locke, for fear of eternal punishment).40 
Yet as Tully observes, /RFNH·VHPSKDVLVRQWKHW\UDQQLFDOUHDFKRIWKH ¶/DZRIReputation· UHIOHFWHGD
concerted meditation on the subject from the mid-1670s. During his first tour of France, in 1675-7, 
Locke translated three of the French Jansenist Pierre Nicole·VUHFHQWO\-published Essais de Morale (1671). 
,Q WKH WKLUG RI WKHVH HVVD\V ¶$ 7UHDWLVH FRQFHUQLQJ WKH :D\ RI 3UHVHUYLQJ3HDFHZLWK 0HQ· 1LFROH
similarly foregrounded the desire for reputation in explaining why men felt obligated to adhere to the 
moral codes which prevailed in their societies: that is, he similarly placed the humanist virtues and vices 
                                                          
39 Including: Ayers, Locke, ii, pp. 185-%UDG\¶/RFNH·VThoughts·SS-50; Dawson, Locke, Language, pp. 218-38, 272-4; 
McClure, Judging Rights, pp. 215-47; and T. Stanton, ¶$XWKRULW\DQG )UHHGRPLQ WKH,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI/RFNH·V3ROLWLFDO
7KHRU\·Political Theory, 39:1 (Feb. 2011), pp. 6-30. 
40 J. 7XOO\¶*RYHUQLQJ&RQGXFW·LQ(/HLWHVHGConscience and Casuistry in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 12-
71, reprinted in idem, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 179-241 (on pp. 210, 
213). The essay is offered in memoriam of Michel Foucault, which partly explains the distinctive perspective it adopts. .For 
further scattered remarks ² not DOZD\VFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQ¶*RYHUQLQJ&RQGXFW·² see Locke in Contexts, 
pp. 62-8, 281-314.  
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within a juridical framework, a point ignored by Tully.41 As would Locke in the Essay, Nicole 
distinguished between three types of law. The first was *RG·V ODZ >lois de justice], which was absolute, 
inflexible and followed solely by the regenerate few. The second type was civil law [lois expresses], which 
was strictly limited in its scope and reach. The third type of law was in practice the most important in 
UHJXODWLQJPHQ·VFRQGXFWLQVRFLHW\7KLVZDV¶WKHODZRIGHFHQF\>lois de bienséance], which is founded on 
WKHFRPPRQFRQVHQWRIPHQZKRKDYHDJUHHG WRFRQGHPQ WKRVHZKRRIIHQGDJDLQVW LW· This law, 
ILUPO\RIPDQ·VRZQPDNLQJHQIRUFHGDFRGHRIFLYLOLW\¶les devoirs de civilité·ZKLFKHQFRXUDJHGPDQ\RI
those virtues that were enjoined by Christian charity (generosity, humility, temperance).  
1LFROH·V$XJXVWLQLDQWKHRORJLFDOFRPPLWPHQWVVKDSHGKLVSURIRXQGO\QHJDWLve evaluation of the lois de 
bienséance.42 True virtue inhered in moral actions performed from a sincere love of God, which only 
recipients of divine grace possessed. <HW WKH ¶ODZRIGHFHQF\·ZDV IROORZHG IRU HQWLUHO\ WKHRSSRVLWH
reason (self-love), rewarding well-EUHGPHQ ¶les honnêtes gens·ZLWK WKHSUDLVHRI WKHLUQHLJKERXUVDQG
punishing those who transgressed with scorn and contempt. Almost all men were motivated to perform 
their duties E\DFRQFHUQIRUWKHJRRGRSLQLRQRIRWKHUV¶WKHLQVLSLGFRnsidHUDWLRQVRIWKHFUHDWXUHV· 
and this ¶FDQQRW EXW UHQGHU KLV SHUIRUPDQFHV OHVVH DFFHSWDEOH WR KLV FUHDWRU· 6RFLHW\ HQJXOIHG PHQ
further in sin and self-idolatry.43 Nicole was nonetheless ZLOOLQJ WR DFFHSW WKDW HYHQ DV ¶WKH YHUWXHV
purely humane are but weaNQHVVHV· WKHVH LPSXUHPRWLYHVPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
ZKDW KH WHUPHG *RG·V ¶grâce génèrale·44 This was the means employed by God to lead men to act 
responsibly in their dealings with others, even as they deserved no credit whatsoever for having done 
so. 8OWLPDWHO\KRZHYHU1LFROH·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVLQDQGUHGHPSWLRQ OHGKLPWRFRQVLGHUWKH¶ODZRI
                                                          
41  ¶$7UHDWLVHFRQFHUQLQJWKH:D\RI3UHVHUYLQJ3HDFHZLWK0HQ·LQJohn Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais of Pierre Nicole 
in French and English, ed. J.S. Yolton (Oxford, 2000), pp. 115-259, where the French original is presented alongside 
/RFNH·V WUDQVODWLRQ /RFNH VSOLW WKH HVVD\ DV 1LFROH GLG QRW LQWR WZR ZLWK VHSDUDWH SDUDJUDSK QXPEHULQJ /RFNH·V
translation has received relatively little historical attention, but see Ayers, Locke, ii, pp. 186-7; Harris, Mind of Locke, pp. 
282-8, 384-7; and J. Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 131-7, 178-86. 
42  For contextual treatments of NLFROH·VPRral theory, see E.D. James, Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Humanist: A Study of his 
Thought (The Hague, 1972), pp. 99-136; N. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France (Princeton, 1980), pp. 262-317; and 
M. Moriarty, Disguised Vices: Theories of Virtue in Early Modern French Thought (Oxford, 2011), pp. 241-52. 
43 ¶3UHVHUYLQJ3HDFH·, in Locke as Translator, 2.82-91; 2.42-3. 
44  ¶$'LVFRXUVHRQWKH:HDNQHVVHRI0DQ·LQibid., pp. 43-113: [para] 61. 
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decency·WROHDGPHQDZD\IURPUDWKHUWKDQWRZDUGV*RGDQGPRUDOWUXWK45 Nicole reinforced a rigid 
(and, in the absence of grace, unbridgeable) distinction between moral action and motive, and between 
¶honnêteté humaine· (acquired, natural virtue) DQG¶honnêteté parfait· (the virtue of the elect). 
/RFNH·VHYHQWXDOSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH¶WKUHHODZV·LQWKHEssay GLIIHUHGPDUNHGO\IURP1LFROH·V. Locke, in 
short, offered a far more positive evaluation of the lois de bienséance. For Locke, there was no necessary 
conflict between the three laws, all of which potentially led men to the performance of their duties 
under natural law (to oneself, God and one another). There is no mention by Locke of the need for an 
infusion of divine grace for men to lead a truly moral life.46 0HQ·V GHVLUHV QR OHVV WKDQ WKHLU UHDVRQ
constituted a crucial part of their divinely created nature. Almost all men considered a good reputation 
to be essential to their happiness in this life; and this was a verdict which Locke, unlike Nicole or 
Pascal, neither denied nor considered to be irreconcilable with Christian soteriology. /RFNH·V journal 
entries from the later 1670s offer us a privileged insight into the development oI/RFNH·VWKLQNLQJRQ
this head. They show Locke preoccupied with working through the implications for morality of a 
hedonic psychology, and particularly focused on the strength and consequenFHVRIPDQ·VFUDYLQJIor 
esteem. Here Locke betrayed his close reading of French authors such as Nicole and Pierre Gassendi.47 
/RFNH·VFRPPRQSODFHERRNIURPDOVRUHYHDOVKLVNHHQLQWHUHVWDWWKLV WLPHLQWKHTXLQWHVVHQWLDO
humanist guidebook to good breeding, Baldassare CasWLJOLRQH·VLibro del Cortegiano (1528). Locke was 
                                                          
45 7KLVWHQVLRQZLWKLQ1LFROH·VPRUDOWKHRU\LVGLVFXVVHGLQ illuminating fashion by J. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of 
the Splendid Vices (London, 2008), pp. 249-61. 
46 In his third lecture of 1663-/RFNHQRWHGWKDWWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKH)DOO ¶GRHVQRWSDUWLFXODUO\FRQFHUQSKLORVRSKHUV·D
position he would maintain even as he might have remained torn on the issue throughout his life (ELN, p. 139). For 
/RFNH·Vposition on the question of original sin, compare and reconcile ,+DUULV¶7KH3ROLWLFVRI&KULVWLDQLW\·LQ*$-
Rogers (ed.), /RFNH·V3KLORVRSK\&Rntent and Context (Oxford, 1994), pp. 197-215; Marshall, Religion and Responsibility, pp. 
141-6; V. Nuovo, Christianity, Antiquity and Enlightenment: Interpretations of Locke (London, 2011), pp. 21-52; and W.M. 
Spellman, John Locke and the Problem of Depravity (Oxford, 1988). 
47 /RFNH·VGHYHORSPHQWRIDKHGRQLFWKHRU\RIPRWLYDWLRQZDVDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\LQIRUPHGE\3LHUUH*DVVHQGL·VZULWLQJVRQ
WKHVXEMHFW)RUWKHPRVWIRUFHIXOVWDWHPHQWRI/RFNH·VLQWHOOHFWXDOGHEWWR*DVVHQGLVHH70/HQQRQ The Battle of the 
Gods and Giants: The Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715 (Princeton, 1993), pp. 149-90. 
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drawn to the psychological insights it offered ² QRWOHDVWWKDW¶ZHDOOORYHFRPPHQGDWLRQV	YHU\KDUGO\
deIHQGRXUVHOYHVIURPIODWWHU\·48 
,QD MRXUQDOHQWU\RI/RFNHUHDIILUPHG1LFROH·Vemphasis on the superior efficacy of a concern 
for reputation RYHUDORYHRI*RG¶7KHst Question, every man ought to aske in all things he doth, or 
undertakes; is, how is this acceptable to God? But the first Question most men ask, is, how will this 
render me to my Company, and those, whose esteeme I value? He that asks neither of these Questions 
is a melancholy Rogue, & allways of the most dangerous, & worst of men.·49 Locke returned to this 
SRLQWLQ¶7he principle spring from which the actions of men take their rise, the rule they conduct 
them by	WKHHQGWRZKLFKWKH\GLUHFWWKHPVHHPHWREHFUHGLWDQGUHSXWDWLRQ·. So powerful was this 
concern that he who ¶ZRX>O@Ggoverne the world well had need consider rather what fashions he makes 
then what laws & to briQJDQ\WKLQJLQWRXVHKHQHHGRQO\JLYHLWUHSXWDWLRQ·50  
:K\ ZDV /RFNH VR LQWHUHVWHG LQ PDQ·V QDWXUDO GHVLUH IRU HVWHHP" +HUH LW LV VLJQLILFDQW WKDW DQRWKHU
LPSRUWDQW SUHVHQFH LQ /RFNH·V MRXUQDOV IURP WKLV SHULRG ZDV Richard Hooker. Locke observed that 
BooN,RI+RRNHU·V monumental Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity E\¶LQODUJLQJ·WKHFRQYHQWLRQDO¶VHQVH·
RI ODZ WHUPHG ¶DQ\NLQGHRI UXOHRU&DQRQZKHUHE\DFWLRQVDUH IUDPHGD ODZ·.51 This indicates how, 
from the 1670s, Locke recognised the power of an alternative definition of law, one seemingly at odds 
with the voluntarist conception which nonetheless continued to structure his thinking. After all, the 
¶/DZ RI Reputation· did not represent the explicit command of a superior whose known attributes 
entitled KLPWRJRYHUQ,QWKLVUHJDUG/RFNHPDGHLWFOHDUWKDWVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJWKLVZDVQR¶ODZ·DWDOO
                                                          
48 MS Locke d.1, p. 57 (1679), though cf. p. 29 (on friendship) and p. 65 (on sprezzatura as the product of imitative 
repetition and self-discipline). Locke owned three editions of the work, one in Italian (1547) and two in Latin (1577, 
1619): The Library of John Locke, ed. J. Harrison & P. Laslett, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1971), nos. 626-627a. For the remarkable 
European influence of the Cortegiano in the early-modern period, see P. Burke, The Fortunes of a Courtier (Cambridge, 
1995).  
49 MS Locke c.27, f.30r (1675). 
50 MS Locke f.3, pp. 381-2 (12 Dec. 1678). 
51 /RFNH·V MRXUQDO IURP  shows that he purchased the Ecclesiastical Polity on 13 June; his reflections oQ +RRNHU·V
conception of law can be found in an entry dated 26 June: MS Locke f.5, pp. 67, 73-7 (on p. 74). Locke refers to Of the 
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker (London, 1676), 1.2, p. 70. 
7KH ¶MXGLFLRXV+RRNHU· LVDVLPLODUO\SUHVLGLQJSUHVHQFH LQ the discussion of law in the Second Treatise, in which Locke 
refers to the Ecclesiastical Polity no fewer than sixteen times. )RU WKH VLJQLILFDQFHRI/RFNH·V UHDGLQJRI+RRNHU DW WKLV
time, see -50LOWRQ¶'DWLQJ/RFNH·VSecond Treatise·History of Political Thought, 16:3 (1995), pp. 356-90.  
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and yet in practice it acted like one, and was crucial in explaining why men behaved as they did (rather 
than necessarily as they ought) in society. Hooker QRQHWKHOHVV YLQGLFDWHG /RFNH·V RZQ VXEVHTXHQW
SUHVHQWDWLRQRIRSLQLRQDVD¶ODZ·EHFDXVHLWIUDPHGPHQ·VDFWLRQVLQDPDQQHUZKLFKIRUWKHPRVWSDUW
conduced to their collective well-being: a definition of law advanced by Hooker in highly distinctive 
fashion in the Ecclesiastical Polity. 
+HUH LW LV LPSRUWDQW WRQRWH/RFNH·V FRQYLFWLRQ WKDWKXPDQQDWXUH FRXOG SURSHUO\ H[DPLQHG UHYHDO
LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW *RG·V ¶(QGV· DQG LQWHQWLRQV IRU PDQNLQG $V KH QRWHG LQ  ¶*RG KDV >VR@
framed the constitutions of our minds and bodies that several things are apt to produce in them 
pleasure and pain, delight and trouble, by ways that we know not, but for ends suitable to his goodness 
DQGZLVGRP·52 /RFNH·VWKRXJKWZDVVWUXFWXUHGDWHYHU\OHYHOE\DGLYLQHWHOHRORJ\WKis point is essential 
for an understanding RI ZK\ /RFNH·V HYDOXDWLRQ RI PDQ·V GHVLUH IRU RWKHUV· DSSURYDO ZDV IDU PRUH
SRVLWLYHWKDQ1LFROH·V² DQGZLOOEHVHHQ+REEHV·V53 God, Locke repeatedly insisted, did nothing in 
vain, and to reflect on human naturH DQGPDQ·VQDWXUDOGHVLUHVZDV WRJDLQDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI+LV
SXUSRVHVIRU+LVFUHDWHGEHLQJV¶ZHFDQLQIHUWKHSULQFLSOHDQGDGHILQLWHUXOHRIRXUGXW\IURPPDQ·V
RZQFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKHIDFXOWLHVZLWKZKLFKKHLVHTXLSSHG·ELN, 157).54 Castiglione recognised the 
craving for esteem to be among the strongest of human desires; and Locke, in turn, provided an 
explanation of how it led mankind to serve the ends for which they had been created.  
Locke agreed with Nicole that ideas of virtue and vice denomiQDWHG¶QRWKLQJHOVHEXWWKDWZKLFKKDV
WKHDOORZDQFHRISXEOLFN(VWHHP· EHU 2.28.10-11). <HW WKH ¶/DZRIReputation· was not arbitrary: it 
developed on the basis of what a particular society found beneficial and advantageous in furthering its 
own ends. It followed that moral distinctions differed between societies separated in space and time, 
                                                          
52 MS Locke f.1, pp. 325-6 (16 July 1676). This entry is mostly LQVKRUWKDQGDQG,XVH9RQ/H\GHQ·VWUDQVFULSWLRQLQELN, 
p. 265. 
53  For discussion, see T. Stanton, ¶1DWXUDO /DZ 1RQFRQIRUPLW\ DQG 7ROHUDWLRQ 7ZR 6WDJHV RQ /RFNH·V :D\·, and I. 
+DUULV¶-RKQ/RFNHDQG1DWXUDO/DZ)UHH:RUVKLSDQG7ROHUDWLRQ·, in J. Parkin & T. Stanton (eds.), Natural Law and 
Toleration in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford, 2013), pp. 25-57, 59-105. 
54  7KLVSRLQWLVZHOOH[SUHVVHGE\)RUVWHU¶%HFDXVHKXPDQQDWXUHZDVPDGHE\*RGLWFDQVKRZXV*RG·VPRUDOSODQIRU
KXPDQLW\·Moral Consensus, p. 11); see, too, Ayers, Locke, ii, p. 187; Dawson, Locke, Language, pp. 278-9; and E. Rossiter, 
¶+HGRQLVPDQG1DWXUDO/DZLQ/RFNH·V0RUDO3KLORVRSK\·Journal of the History of Philosophy, 54:2 (2016), pp. 203-25. 
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since practices that were found necessary and advantageous to one might prove disastrous to another. 
,Q ¶2I (WKLFN LQ *HQHUDO· (c. 1686-8), originally composed as a chapter to be included in the Essay, 
/RFNH UHGXFHG WKHVH YDULDWLRQV WR D ¶JHQHUDOl UXOH· ¶7KRVH DFWLRQV DUH HVWHHPHG YLUWXRXV· /RFNH
GHFODUHG¶ZKLFKDUHWKRXJKWDEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\WRWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIVRFLHW\s, & those that disturb 
or dissolve the Bonds of community are every where esteemed ill & vitLRXV·55 At this point in his 
argument Locke returned to the question of the relationship between utility and truth, and human and 
divine law, with which he had ended his lectures of 1663-4. Locke argued that God in his goodness 
KDG¶E\DQLQVHSDUDEOHFRQQH[LRQMRLQHGVirtue and publick Happiness together; and made the Practice 
thereof, necessary to the preservation of Society, and visibly beneficial to all, with whom the Virtuous 
0DQKDV WRGR· EHU 1.3/RFNH HPSKDVLVHG WKDW WKHUHZDV ¶QRWKLQJ WKDW VRGLUHFWO\ DQGYLVLEO\
secures, and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws, [God] 
has set them, and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion, as the neglect RI WKHP· EHU 
2.28.11). $VDFRQVHTXHQFHRI*RG·VGHVLJQin seeking collectively to improve their lot in this life men 
LQVRFLHW\LQYDULDEO\EHKDYHGLQZD\VEURDGO\FRQIRUPDEOHWRWKHODZV¶VHW·IRUWKHPE\*RG.  
+HUH /RFNH·V KHGRQLF H[SODQDWLRQ RI KXPDQ action is important. In a journal entry of 1676, Locke 
noted that men were moved solely by a desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, and that their passions 
were overwhelmingly self-regarding.56 In their natural state men were inherently solipsistic, and 
FRQVLGHUHGDV¶JRRG·ZKDWHYHUDGYDQFHGWKHLULPPHGLDWHLQWHUHVWVHere again Locke broadly accepted 
+REEHV·VSUHPLVH¶0HQ·V$SSHWLWHV·ZRXOG/RFNHDJUHHG¶LIOHIWWRWKHLUIXOOVZLQJ>@FDUU\0HQWR
the over-WXUQLQJRIDOO0RUDOLW\· (EHU 1.3.13). However, Locke noted that ¶VLQFHPHQLQVRFLHW\DUHLQ
a far different estate than when considered single and alone, the instances and measures of virtue and 
YLFHDUHYHU\GLIIHUHQW·57 ,QH[SODLQLQJWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIPDQ·VDSSHWLWHVLQVRFLHW\² their sense of 
                                                          
55 MS Locke c.28, f. 148. For an earlier statement of this point, MS Locke f.3, pp. 266-7 (26 Aug. 1678): ¶7KDWYHUWXHLVEut 
the name of such actions as are most conduceing to the good of society & are therefor by the society recommended by 
DOOPHDQHVWRWKHSUDFWLVHRIWKHSHRSOHVHHPVWRPHYHU\SODLQ· 
56  MS Locke f.1, pp. 325-47 (16 July 1676): partially in shorthand, and transcribed by Von Leyden, ELN, pp. 265-72. 
57  MS Film 77, pp. 10-11 (1681). 
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what was desirable, and what was not ² the desire for esteem was crucial. As Locke had commented in 
1663-4¶DJUHDWQXPEHURIYLUWXHVDQGWKHEHVWRIWKHPFRQVLVWRQO\LQWKLVWKDWZHGRJRRGWRRWKHUV
DWRXURZQORVV·ELN, 150). On account of WKHLUGHVLUHIRUHVWHHPPHQ·VLGHDVRIZKDWFRQGXFHGWR
their happiness altered significantly and irreversibly in society. What might seem an irrational course of 
action to the self-centred pre-social individual ² acts of charity, for example ² no longer appeared so to 
WKHVRFLDOLVHGPDQZKRUHFRJQLVHGWKHSOHDVXUHRIDFWLQJLQZD\VDSSURYHGRIE\RWKHUV¶5HSXWDWLRQ·
/RFNHREVHUYHG¶,ILQGHHYHU\ERG\LVSOHDVHGZLWKDQGWKHZDQWRILWLVDFRQVWDQWWRUPHQW·IRUDOPRVW
all men it constituted an essential part of their happiness.58 $Q\ ¶ORVV· LQFXUUHGE\ WKHYLUWXRXVPDQ
then, was more than compensated for by the pleasure derived from esteem¶,IWKHQKDSSLQHVVHEHRXU
LQWHUHVWHQG	EXVLQHVV·/RFNHGHFODUHGLQ¶·WLVHYLGHQWWKHZD\WRLWLVWRORve our neighbour as 
our self, for by that means we enlarge & secure our pleasures, since then all the good we doe to them 
UHGRXEOHVXSRQRXUVHOYHV	JLYHVXVDQXQGHFD\LQJ	XQLQWHUUXSWHGSOHDVXUH·59  
Locke observed that a good reputation was advantageous to the individual, because it further energised 
him to endeavour to be worthy of it ² a point made strongly by Castiglione as by Cicero (on whose De 
Officiis and De Oratore the Cortegiano was modelled).60 ,W IXUQLVKHGKLPZLWK ¶D VRUWRIPRUDO VWUHQJWK
whereby a man is enabled to do, as it were, by an augmented force, that which others, of equal natural 
SDUWVDQGQDWXUDOSRZHUFDQQRWGRZLWKRXWLW· 7KHODFNRIHVWHHPFRQYHUVHO\¶PDNHVDPDQLQFDSDEOH
of having the authority, and doing the good, which oWKHUZLVHKHPLJKW·61 If this was something of a 
KXPDQLVW FRPPRQSODFH KRZHYHU WKH QRYHOW\ RI /RFNH·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ OD\ LQ KLV HPSKDVLV RQ the 
beneficial social function of this concern for reputation. Here it is important to note that this powerful 
desirH WR ZLQ WKH HVWHHP RI RWKHUV ¶JORU\· had been foregrounded by Hobbes, but considered 
                                                          
58  MS Locke c.28, f.143v (c. 1686-8). 
59 MS Locke c.42B, p. 224 (1692). 
60 -5LFKDUGV ¶Assumed Simplicity and the Critique of Nobility: 2U+RZ&DVWLJOLRQH5HDG&LFHUR·, Renaissance Quarterly, 
54:2 (2001), pp. 460-)RU/RFNH·V DEXQGDQWO\ WHVWLILHG UHYHUHQFH IRU &LFHUR VHH0DUVKDOO John Locke, pp. 157-204, 
292-326; and Phillip Mitsis, ¶/RFNH·V 2IILFHV· LQ - 0LOOHU 	 % ,QZRRG HGV Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy 
(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 45-61)RU/RFNH·VEURDGHUHQJDJHPHQWZLWKKXPDQLVWUKHWRULFDOWHFKQLTXHVDQGDUJXPHQWVIRU
toleration, see G. Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (Pennsylvania, 1996), pp. 203-48. 
61 MS Film 77, pp. 10-11 (1681). 
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HPLQHQWO\ GDQJHURXV 7KH FRQFHUQ IRU ¶5HSXWDWLRQ· ZDV RQH FDXVH RI FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ PHQ LQ WKHLU
natural state.62 In marked contrast it allowed Locke to explain how society might have been possible 
prior to ² and without the need for ² political authority QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ PDQ·V selfish and asocial 
tendencies.63  
 In an early (1671) draft of the EssaySULRU WRKLVGHYHORSPHQWRI WKHFRQFHSWRID ¶ODZ·RIRSLQLRQ
Locke had QRWHGWKDWHYHQ¶LIWKHUHZHUHQRHODZQRHSXQLVKPHQWQRHREOLJDWLRQKXPDQHRUGLYLQH\HW
there must & would be in the societys of men notions of virtues & vices Justice temperance & 
)RUWLWXGH	F·64 Yet given his denial of a natural predisposition to the good ² whether on the basis of 
PDQ·VLQKHUHQWVRFLDELOLW\LQQDWHLGHDVRUQDWXUDOPRUDOFRQVFLHQFH² it is unclear how Locke thought 
WKLVFODLPFRXOGEHVXEVWDQWLDWHG7KLVLVZKDWPDQ·VQDWXUDOGHVLUHIRUHVWHHPDOORZHG/RFNHLQ
to begin to explain. It rendered the Lockean individual pliable, and ensured that his estimations of what 
was pleasurable or painful were shaped in socially-beneficial ways through his interaction with others. 
7KH¶/DZRIReputation· could serve effectively, insensibly anGTXLWHQDWXUDOO\WRUHQGHUPHQ·VVHQVHRI
their own interest broadly conformable to that of the society of which they were a part, so concerned 
were they to win the approval of others. A reconciliation between private and public interest was 
possible withRXWWKHQHHGIRU+REEHV·V/HYLDWKDQVWDWH 
,W LVZRUWK UHIOHFWLQJ IXUWKHURQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WKH ¶/DZRI 5HSXWDWLRQ·, guided by temporal 
XWLOLW\ DQG WKH ODZ RI QDWXUH ZKLFK H[SUHVVHG *RG·V ZLOO DQG GHFUHH ² between the local and the 
transcendentWKHFRQWLQJHQWDQGWKHLPPXWDEOH/RFNH·VWKHRU\RILGHDVDQGODQJXDJHLQWKHEssay only 
further complicated his fundamental claim that the law of nature was accessible to human reason: the 
epistemological difficulties, Locke came to recognise, were great indeed. Yet Locke argued that visceral 
H[SHULHQFHZDVFUXFLDOWKDWLVPDQNLQG·VFROOHFWLYHVWUXJJOHWRRYHUFRPHWKHREVWDFOHVSUHVHQWHGE\D
                                                          
62  ¶,QWKH nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. 
7KHILUVWPDNHWKPHQLQYDGHIRU*DLQWKHVHFRQGIRU6DIHW\DQGWKHWKLUGIRU5HSXWDWLRQ·Leviathan, ii, 1.13, p. 192. 
63  /RFNH·V FRQFHUQ WR ¶H[SODLQ VRFLHW\ LQ WHUPV WKDW ZHUH LQGHSHQGHQW RI JRYHUQPHQW· LV HPSKDVLVHG E\ I. +DUULV ¶7KH
Legacy of Two Treatises of Government·Eighteenth-Century Thought, 3 (2007), pp. 143-68 (on p. 157). 
64 ¶'UDIW$·LQDrafts for the Essay concerning Human Understanding, and Other Philosophical Writings, ed. P.H. Nidditch & 
G.A.J. Rogers (Oxford, 1990), §25, p. 41. 
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OHVV WKDQ ERXQWHRXV 0RWKHU 1DWXUH D SURFHVV ZLWKLQ ZKLFK PHQ·V UHDVRQLQJ IDFXOWLHV WKHPVHOYHV
developed from a low base. This taught individuals to behave in ways consistent with the immutable 
duties of natural law, even if they failed to understand (on the basis of reason) why they ought to do so. 
To employ a distinction favoured by Hooker ² whose conception of human reason was rather less 
naïvely optimistic than is sometimes supposed ² PHQPLJKW¶DSSUHKHQG·WUXWKVZKLFKWKH\QRQHWKHOHVs 
FRXOG QRW IXOO\ ¶FRPSUHKHQG·65 ¶,W PXVW EH DOORZHG· /RFNH DUJXHG ¶WKDW VHYHUDO 0RUDO 5XOHV PD\
receive, from Mankind, a very general Approbation, without either knowing, or admitting the true 
JURXQGRI0RUDOLW\·(+8 In a journal entry of 1693, Locke made this point particularly clearly: 
¶7KHUH EH WZR SDUWV RI (WKLFNV WKH RQH LV WKH UXOH ZKLFK PHQ DUH JHQHUDOO\ LQ WKH ULght in (though 
perhaps they have not deduced them as they should from their true principles). The other is the true 
motives to practice them and the ways to bring men to observe them, & these are generaly either not 
ZHOONQRZQRUQRWULJKWO\DSSO\G·66 Societies might collectively act in ways which were consistent with 
natural law despite their ignorance of its true foundations. Here Locke distinguished between moral 
motivation and obligation in a manner which is highly distinctive, not least when compared with Nicole 
and Hobbes.67 7KH ¶WUXH JURXQG RI 0RUDOLW\· FRXOG RQO\ EH JUDVSHG E\ WKRVH ZKR UHFRJQLVHG WKH
existence of a divine creator who governed the world, imposed duties on men, and would reward or 
punish them on the Day of Judgment. Locke expressed doubt in the Essay that these cardinal, but 
complex ideas could be established on grounds more firm than probability on the basis of reason alone. 
Yet visceral experience might provide what ratiocination, without the assistance of revelation, struggled 
to offHU VXIILFLHQWO\FRPSHOOLQJ UHDVRQV WR OLYH LQ DPDQQHUZKLFKZDVEURDGO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWKRQH·V
GXWLHVDV*RG·VFUHDWXUH 
In this regard, Locke argued WKDWWKH¶/DZRIReputation· served a useful, even indispensable purpose, in 
supplementing civil law. LocNH·VH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKH¶/DZRI2SLQLRQ· was, for want of 
                                                          
65 2QZKLFKVHH+RRNHU·VVHUPRQ¶2IWKH&HUWDLQW\DQG3HUSHWXLW\RI)DLWKLQWKH(OHFW·SUHDFKHGLQ-6 and included 
in the 1676 eGLWLRQRI+RRNHU·VWorks, which Locke purchased in 1681: Works of Hooker, pp. 550-56. 
66  MS Locke c.28, f. 113r (1693). 
67  StaQWRQ¶+REEHVDQG/RFNH·S$\HUVLocke, ii, p. 194. 
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DEHWWHUGHVFULSWLRQ¶ERWWRP-XS·UDWKHUWKDQ¶WRS-GRZQ· ¶7KHUHDUH·/RFNHREVHUYHGLQ¶VHYHUDO
things to be introduced by custom & fashion which are of great use and yet cannot be well established 
E\ODZV·68 7KLVSURFHVV/RFNHHPSKDVLVHGZDVDQRYHUZKHOPLQJO\JRRGWKLQJ¶LIZHOOFRQVLGHUHG>LW@
will give us better boundaries of virtue and vice than curious questions stated with the nicest 
GLVWLQFWLRQV· Those virtues which made life in society pleasurable ² VXFK DV ¶FLYLOLW\ FKDULW\ [and] 
OLEHUDOLW\· ZKLFK /RFNH YDOXHG YHU\ KLJKO\ LQGHHG ² necessarily existed independently of retributive 
justice and could not be dictated or enforced by civil law.69 In the far from Utopian commonwealth 
RXWOLQHG LQ MRXUQDO HQWULHV HQWLWOHG ¶$WODQWLV·/RFNH IXUWKHUQRWHG WKHHIILFDF\DQG LPSRUWDQFHRI WKH
communal enforcement of moral discipline in a manner which might have chimed with his early-
modern English readers, who were well-acquainted with the extensive practice of neighbourhood self-
government.70 ¶(very man being a watch upon his neighbour·/RFNHDUJXHG ¶faults will be prevented, 
which is better than tKDW WKH\ VKRXOGEHSXQLVKG· ¶0ore things· KH FRQWLQXHG ¶for the good of the 
SXEOLTXHDUHWREHLQWURGXFHGE\FXVWRPH	IDVKLRQWKHQE\ODZ	SXQLVKPHQW·71 
A FDVHLQSRLQWZDVIHPDOH¶PRGHVW\·¶0DQ\WKLQJV·/RFNHDUJXHG¶QDWXUDOO\EHFRPHYLFHVLQVRFLHW\
ZKLFKZLWKRXWWKDWZRXOGEHLQQRFHQWDFWLRQV·)HPDOHSURPLVFXLW\ZDVQRt clearly proscribed by either 
¶QDWXUHRUUHDVRQ· ¶PRGHVW\WKHJUHDWYLUWXHRIWKHZHDNHUVH[KDVRIWHQRWKHUUXOHVDQGERXQGVVHWE\
custom and reputation, than what it has by direct instances of the law of nature or in a solitude or an 
estate separate from WKLV RU WKDW VRFLHW\· ,W ZDV VROHO\ KHU FRQFHUQ WR DYRLG ¶DQ\ EOHPLVK RQ KHU
UHSXWDWLRQ·WKDWled a woman to take pleasure in a monogamous relationship, thereby dedicating herself 
WR ¶WKH FKLHI HQG RI KHU EHLQJ WKH SURSDJDWLRQ RI PDQNLQG· (a fundamental duty emphasised in the 
Treatises). This illustrated how the LQGLYLGXDO·s sense of heU¶LQWHUHVW·DQG¶KDSSLQHVV· altered significantly 
                                                          
68 British Library Additional Manuscripts [BL Add. MS] 15,642, p. 22 (22 Feb. 1679). 
69 MS Locke c.28, f. 140v (c. 1677-)RU/RFNH·VHQWLUHO\FRQYHQWLRQDOUHJDUGIRUWKHVHYLUWXHVVHH+DUULVMind of Locke, 
pp. 17-44, 252-89; and Marshall, Religion and Responsibility, pp. 157-204, 292-326. 
70 As noted by McClure, Judging Rights, pp. 137-43. For local government in this period, C. -&ORYHU¶Law and the Order of 
3RSXODU&XOWXUH·Ln A. Sarat & T.R Kerns (eds.), Law in the Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor, MI, 1998), pp. 97²119; and 
Steve Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550²1640 (New York, 2000), pp. 94-115. 
71 MS Locke f.2, pp. 297-8 (14 Oct. 1677); c.42B, p. 36 (1679). 
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and beneficially in society, and did so in ways which brought it into line with the duties enshrined in 
natural law.72  
Locke·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFUXFLDOUROHSOD\HGE\WKH¶/DZRIReputation· in leading men to perform 
their duties under natural law impacted upon his understanding of the jurisdiction and role of political 
authority in important ways. The ideas of virtue and vice which prevailed in a given society were 
contingent, and evolved quite naturally according to what was visibly beneficial to the community as a 
whole. In a similar vein, Locke argued that civil law ought to evolve according to what was found to be 
publicly useful. In a journal entry of 1681, Locke noted that knowledge of government, like that of 
natural bodies, was to bHJOHDQHGRQO\IURP¶KLVWRU\	PDWWHURIIDFW·The way of discovery in natural 
philosophy ought similarly to inform the political prudence required of legislators.73 Rather than 
searching for speculative truths, the magistrate ought solely to concern himself with practical 
knowledge of what courses of action proved to be publicly beneficial: on the latter issue he could 
¶VFDUFH HUU·, whereas on the former such error was inevitable.74 Thus understood, tKH ¶Civil LDZ·
supplemented the moral codes which had already recommended themselves to WKH¶Law of Reputation·: 
it did not, as for Hobbes, constitute them. This is not to say, of course, that Locke did not attach great 
importance to justice, and hence to civil law: from the moment the invention of money had inflamed 
PDQ·VGHVLUHV and disturbed peaceful co-existence in the state of nature, political authority was essential 
(TT II: §45-51).75 For this reason, justice ZDV¶WKHJUHDWHVWDQGGLIILFXOWHVWGXW\·; RQFHHVWDEOLVKHG¶WKH
UHVWZLOOQRWEHKDUG·76 Instead, it is to make the point that, for Locke and unlike Hobbes, a sense of 
common interest and moral accountability nonetheless existed independently of government.  
                                                          
72 MS Film 77, pp. 10-11 (1681); see, too, BL Add MS 15,642, p. 22 (1679). 
73  As James Tully argues/RFNHGUDZV¶DGHILQLWLYHGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQSROLWLFDOWKHRU\DQGHPSLULFDOSROLWLFDOVFLHQFH·DQGLQ
the Treatises seeks primarily to offer the former: A Discourse on Property, pp. 28-30. 
74 MS Locke f. 5, pp. 77-83 (26 June 1681); ¶An (VVD\FRQFHUQLQJ7ROHUDWLRQ· (1667), in Political Writings, pp. 191-2. 
75 Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge, 1988). References to the relevant Treatise and paragraph number are 
provided in brackets in the text, as above. 
76  MS Locke c.28, f. 140r (c. 1677-8). For comprehensive discussion of the invention of money as perpetuating a moral-
epistemological crisis only overcome through the construction of political institutions and civil law, see McClure, Judging 
Rights, pp. 156-87. 
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7KHVHWZRPDQPDGH¶/DZV·ZHUHPXWXDOO\-complementary: both developed according to the needs of 
the community. Given that the law set for men by God was intended for their benefit as well as His 
glory, in properly-constituted political societies these laws were broadly consistent with natural law. 
Locke provided two examples to make this point. The first was historical (late republican, pre-Christian 
Rome), the second more theoretical (the depiction of social development in the Second Treatise).  
¶(ven in the Corruption of Manners,· /RFNH GHFODUHG ¶the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, 
ZKLFKRXJKWWREHWKH5XOHRI9HUWXHDQG9LFHZHUHSUHWW\ZHOOSUHVHUYHG·EHU 2.28.11). Given what 
he goes on to say, it seems clear that here Locke has D GLVWLQFWO\ DGYDQFHG DQG ¶FLYLOL]HG· KHDWKHQ
society, ancient Rome, primarily in mind. Rome offered an example of how, in well-regulated heathen 
VRFLHWLHV WKRVHDFWLRQVWKDW ¶visibly·FRQWULEXWHGWR ¶SXEOLFN+DSSLQHVV·ZHUHGHQRPLQDWHGYirtues, and 
those that exercised a contrary effect were denounced as vices. ,Q¶ROG5RPH·VSHFXODWLYHSKLORVRSKHUV
had fundamentally PLVXQGHUVWRRG WKH ¶WUXH JURXQG RI 0RUDOLW\· FRQFRFWLQJ HUURQHRXV WKHRULHV RI
PRUDOREOLJDWLRQDQGPDQ·VWUXHHQGWKHsummum bonum) (EHU 2.21.55).77 Yet in practice, the failings 
of the heathen philosophers had been of negligible consequence. IW ZDV QRW WR ¶WKHVH OHDUQHG
'LVSXWDQWV·EXW UDWKHUWR ¶6WDWHVPHQWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQWVRI WKH:RUOGRZHGWKHLU3HDFH'HIHQFH
and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned Mechanick (a Name of Disgrace) that they 
UHFHLYHG WKH LPSURYHPHQWV RI XVHIXO $UWV· EHU 3.10.9).78 The dogmatic philosophers were left to 
bicker on the margins of a civil society to which they contributed nothing.  
Meanwhile the national (pagan) religion had nothing to say regarding morality, and its teachings were 
not held accountable to reason: it simply offered a means by which the credulous multitude might allay 
WKHLU IHDUV UHJDUGLQJ WKH JRGV· YHQJHDQFH DQG VHcure their favour.79 The civil magistrate in Rome 
                                                          
77  /RFNH·VPRFNHU\RIWKHPRUDOSKLORVRSK\RIWKHDQFLHQWV bears a striking similarity to Hobbes·s: compare the passage 
referred to above with Leviathan, ii, 1.11, p. 150. Locke made this point even more strongly in the Reasonableness of 
Christianity.  
78  This passage first appears in ¶'UDIW%· (1671) in Drafts for the Essay, §88, p. 196. 
79  Cf. MS Film 77, p. 93 (1698). For the absence of any rational examination of the truth-claims of pagan religion, see the 
¶'LVFRXUVHRI0LUDFOHV·c.1702) in Writings on Religion, ed. V. Nuovo (Oxford, 2002)S¶LWLVDQDstonishing Mark of 
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perfectly understood his commission as being confined to the security and temporal well-being of his 
society ² DFHQWUDOWKHPHLQ/RFNH·VReasonableness of Christianity (1695) ² and had no interest in imposing 
particular speculative opinions in either religion or morality. For precisely this reason, Locke observed 
in 1676 that ¶KHDWKHQ SROLWLFV· revealed the true purpose and jurisdiction of civil government: they 
VKRZHGWKDW¶WKHUHFDQEHQRHRWKHUHQGDVVLJQHG·WRJRYHUQPHQW¶EXWWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQof the members 
of that society in peace & saf[e]ty WRJHWKHU· DQG WKLV ¶JLYH>V@ XV WKH UXOH RI FLYLO REHGLHQFH·80 The 
5RPDQ PDJLVWUDWH·V FRUUHFW JUDVS RI WKH VFRSH DQG HQG RI KLV DXWKRULW\ ensured that the ideas of 
virtue and vice entertained by the society at large were permitted to evolve, quite naturally, according to 
what was found to be in the public interest. 2QDFFRXQWRI*RG·V JXDUDQWHHRI DKDUPRQ\ between 
public utility and normative duty, WKH¶/DZRIReputation·WKH¶Civil /DZ· and ¶Divine /DZ·DV\HWODUJHO\
unknown to men) remained in some degree of harmony. It was, indeed, GXH WR ¶WKH ZRQGHUIXO
3URYLGHQFHRI*RG·WKDW&KULVW was made flesh in an age and place where the scope and jurisdiction of 
human law was properly understood (RC 120).81    
In the Second Treatise, Locke similarly hints at this separation between moral motivation and obligation, 
practical conduct and speculative knowledge. One archetypal truth underpinning the Treatises was that 
WKH ¶/aw of Nature [...] teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or PRVVHVVLRQV· 7KHUH LV D
distinction between this claim, and the subsequent explanation Locke provided as to why men ought 
nRW WR GR VR 7KH\ DUH ¶DOO WKH :RUNPDQVKLS RI RQH 2PQLSRWHQW DQG LQILQLWHO\ ZLVH 0aNHU· HYHU\
LQGLYLGXDO LV ¶KLV 3URSHUW\· DQG WKHUHIRUH HYHU\ PDQ LV ¶bound to preserve himself· DV ZHOO DV ¶the rest of 
Mankind· T II: §67KHODWWHUSURYLGHVWKHWUXHQRUPDWLYH¶5XOH·WKDWHVWDEOLVKHVZK\PHQRXJKW to 
perform their duties, and UHVSHFWRQHDQRWKHU·VLQDOLHQDEOHULJKWV. As Jeremy Waldron and others have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
KRZIDUWKH*RGRIWKLV:RUOGKDVEOLQGHG0HQV0LQGVLIZHFRQVLGHUWKDWWKH*HQWLOH:RUOGUHFHLY·GDQGVWXFNWRD
5HOLJLRQZKLFKQRWEHLQJGHULYHGIURP5HDVRQKDGQRVXUH)RXQGDWLRQLQ5HYHODWLRQ· 
80  MS Locke f.1, pp. 124-5 (25 Feb. 1676).   
81  7KH HQYLRXV -HZV LQVLQXDWHG WKDW &KULVW·V FODLP WR NLQJVKLS WKUHDWHQHG WKH FLYLO PDJLVWUDWH·V authority, but Pilate 
UHFRJQLVHGVXFKDFODLPWREHVSHFLRXV¶IRUD.LQJGRPLQDQRWKHU:RUOGPilate knew that his Master at Rome concerned 
not hiPVHOI·: The Reasonableness of Christianity [1695], in Writings on Religion, pp. 85-210 (on pp. 118-19). Henceforth page 
numbers are referred to in brackets in the text. 
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noted, however, there is no suggestion that, in practice, it was the rational comprehension of this rule 
that led men to behave in ways conformable with the law of nature.82 Instead Locke offers a more 
naturalistic, anthropological story which is broadly consistent with his hedonic psychology and sceptical 
epistemology in the Essay /RFNH·V HPSKDVLV UHVWV RQ PHQ·V ¶QHHGV· DQG ¶ZDQWV· ZKLFK LQ VRFLHW\
QDWXUDOO\ OHG WKHP WR DFW LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK ¶WKH YRLFH RI UHDVRQ FRQILUPHG E\ LQVSLUDWLRQ· WKH
6FULSWXUHVZLWK¶*RGDQGKLV5eason·ZLWK¶WKH/DZRI*RGDQGKLVQDWXUH· GoG¶GLUHFWHG·PDQLQKLV
QDWXUDOVWDWH¶E\KLV6HQVHVDQG5HDVRQ·WR¶PDNHXVHRIWKRVHWKLQJVWKDWZHUHQHFHVVDU\RUXVHIXOWR
KLV%HLQJ·T I: §86). Two elements are combined in the Treatises ² the explanatory, and the normative ² 
without any apparent teQVLRQ 7KH XQLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH WZR PHQ·V GHVLUHV DQG QHHGV DQG *RG·V
FRPPDQGPHQWVWKURXJKUHYHODWLRQLVHQVXUHGE\*RG·VDXWKRUVKLSRIboth.83  
0HQ IROORZLQJ WKH ¶'LFWDWHV RI WKH /DZ RI5eason which God KDG LPSODQWHG LQ KLP· ZHUH OHG LQWR
society for the sDNHRI¶1HFHVVLW\&RQYHQLHQFHDQG,QFOLQDWLRQ·T II: §77). Here the LQGLYLGXDO·V sense 
of his own interest was beneficially and SURYLGHQWLDOO\DOWHUHGE\¶WKHmutual Influence, Sympathy, and 
CRQQH[LRQ·he experienced with others (T II: §212). Definitions of virtue were shaped by what was 
found to be advantageous to that society as a wholeDV/RFNH·VIDYRXULWH H[DPSOHRI¶Conjugal Society·
once again illustrated; and this process allowed that society to further the ends for which it was 
FRQVWLWXWHG ¶nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is 
PDGH·T II: §83).84 0HQ·VGHVLUHVZHUHPRXOGHGLQVRFLHW\LQDPDQQHUWKDWHQFRXUDJHGWKHPWRDFWLQ
wa\V EURDGO\ FRQIRUPDEOH WR WKH ¶/DZ RI 1DWXUH· PDGH V\QRQ\PRXV ZLWK ¶Divine /DZ· 7KH ¶/DZ·
HVWDEOLVKHGLQFLYLOVRFLHW\E\¶WDFLWAgreemHQW·in the Second Treatise LVWKH¶Rule of Propriety·DWHUPXVHG
LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ ZLWK WKH ¶Law of Reputation· LQ WKH Essay (EHU 3.7.7; T II: §36). All is guided by a 
FRQFHUQ IRU ¶the Conveniency of Life· DQG WKH SXUVXLW RI WHPSRUDO KDSSLQHVV (YHQ DV WKH\ IDLOHG WR
                                                          
82 - :DOGURQ ¶-RKQ /RFNH 6RFLDO &RQWUDFW 9HUVXV 3ROLWLFDO $QWKURSRORJ\· Review of Politics, 51:1 (1989), pp. 3-28:    
Casson, Liberating Judgment, pp. 223-0F&OXUH¶´&DWR·V5HWUHDWµ·DQG6KDQNVAuthority Figures, pp. 87-111. 
83 +DUULV¶/HJDF\RIWKHTwo Treatises·SS-7. 
84 ,Q WKLV UHJDUG WKH JUHDW HUURU RI )LOPHU·V SDWULDUFKDO account of the origins of political obligation was qualitatively 
identical to that of the ¶$UFK-3KLORVRSKHU· Aristotle and the Stoics in their moral theory: he took a practice that had 
developed on the basis of its utility³conjugal society, and a respect fRUWKH¶Authority and Government·RIRQH·VIDWKHU³as 
true in itself (andLQ)LOPHU·VFDVH divinely commanded) (T II: §74-5). 
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FRPSUHKHQG WKH WUXH ¶5XOH· H[SODLQLQJ ZK\ WKH\ RXJKW WR GR VR PHQ·V GLYLQHO\-implanted desires 
naturally led them into society and, once there, the concern for esteem helped to ensure that, 
collectively, they served the purposes for which they had been created.85 It was for this reason that 
Locke rendered utility and virtue synonymous (¶LWZDVXVHOHVVDVZHOODVGLVKRQHVW [...]·T II: §36; §51).  
In the Treatises Locke is less interested than in the Essay in exploring how men·V OLYLQJWRJHWKHU¶DIIHFWV
WKHPSV\FKRORJLFDOO\DQGPRUDOO\·86 TKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKH¶Rule of Propriety·ZLWKWKHEssay·V¶/DZRI
Reputation· QRQHWKHOHVVRIIHUV DPHDQVRIEHWWHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ a ¶'oFWULQH·ZKLFK/RFNH thought his 
reader would ILQG¶YHU\VWUDQJH·7KLVZDVKLVfoundational claim that, in the state of nature, every man 
KDVWKH¶ULJKW·WRSXnish those who transgress the law of nature, and hence to assist their neighbours to 
preserve their lives and possessions (T II: §7-9).87 The Treatises establish the theoretical grounds of this 
rightZKLFKZDVQRWKLQJEXWWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO·VGXW\XQGHUQDWXUDOODZWR¶preserve the 
rest of Mankind·,n the absence of a firm rational grasp of their normative duties, however, we might ask 
what could have motivated self-interested men in practice WRH[HUFLVHWKHPVHOYHVRQRWKHUV·EHKDOI" Even 
as Locke was not required to offer such an explanation in a work of political theory, it is nonetheless 
DUJXDEOHWKDWKHKDGWKHFRQFHSWXDOUHVRXUFHVDWKLVGLVSRVDO WRGRVRKDGKHIHOW LWQHFHVVDU\0HQ·V
DELOLW\WRDJUHHRQD¶Rule of Propriety·DQGWKHLUmotivation to adhere to it, was ultimately a consequence 
of their mutual desire for the good opinion of others. This craving for admiration and esteem, in turn, 
provides a compelling reason why individuals might actively DVVLVW WKHLUQHLJKERXUV WRHQIRUFHD ¶Rule·
which had been found conducive to their common advantage. John Dunn observes that in the Treatises 
Locke simply assumes that PHQKDGQHYHU OLYHG DV+REEHV VXJJHVWHG LQ DQ ¶HWKLFDOYDFXXP·RXWRI
which political society had to be created. For Dunn, this point illustrates that Locke was addressing a 
TXLWHGLIIHUHQW ¶SUREOHP·WR+REEHV; FRQVHTXHQWO\FRPSDULQJKLVZRUNWR+REEHV·s ¶LVnot the way to 
                                                          
85  On the origins and implications of human sociability, see MS Locke f.3, p. 202 (15 July 1678). 
86  Plamenatz, Man and Society, i, p. 344. 
87  )RUWKHGLVWLQFWLYHQDWXUHRI/RFNH·VWKHRU\RISRSXODUVRYHUHLJQW\VHH7XOO\Locke in Contexts, pp. 15-29, 299-300. 
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DSSURDFK WKHVWXG\RI/RFNH·.88 <HW/RFNH·VDSSDUHQWO\XQWURXEOHGDVVXPSWLRQ LQhis political theory 
that an understanding of justice and the social virtues exists ² and is felt to impose obligations on men 
² in their pre-political state assumes what Locke had elsewhere worked out and explained, in large part as 
D PHDQV RI UHVSRQGLQJ WR +REEHV :KHQ UHDG LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI /RFNH·V VRFLDO WKHRU\ DQG PRUDO
philosophy as a whole, the Second Treatise offers us an individual who is beneficially, providentially and 
irreversibly shaped by the society of which he is a part. 
III 
If the foregoing indicates the constructive, explanatory role accorded to a concern for reputation in 
/RFNH·V DFFRXQW RI WKH GHYHOopment of societies, his thinking on this score was nonetheless deeply 
ambivalent. Indeed, /RFNH·V WKHRU\ RI VRFLDO GHYHORSPHQW KDV VRPHWKLQJ RI $GDP 6PLWK·V ¶QDWXUDO
SURJUHVVRIRSXOHQFH·LQWKHWealth of Nations about it: that is, it describes how things ought optimally, 
even providentially, to have unfolded; how they had, indeed, done so for a time; but how, due to 
accident, caprice and the inherent weakness of human nature, this process had been subverted. The 
consequences of such subversion were, however, uniformly negative for Locke. By way of example: in 
the Treatises Locke implied that certain primitive, indigenous, heathen societies in the Americas offered 
real-world instantiations of the relatively harmonious and peaceful state of nature from which all men 
DQGFLYLOJRYHUQPHQWVXSSRVHGO\HPHUJHG7KH¶:RRGVDQG)RUHVWV·ZHUHILWWRJLYHUXOHVWR¶WKRVHWKDW
FDOOWKHPVHOYHV&LYLODQG5DWLRQDO·77,89 Yet the First Treatise is, like the Essay, crammed with 
¶WDOHVRIWKHZDQGHULQJXQGHDGFDQQLEDOLVWLFULWXDOVDQGFDVWUDWLQJIDWKHUV·LOOXVWUDWLQJKRZHJUHJLRXVO\
entire primitive communities had nonetheless violated the dictates of natural law.90    
                                                          
88  J. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 77-9. 
89 Elsewhere, too, when Locke is exploring the capacity of societies to cohere independently of government, heathen 
communities such as the native Canadians possess a purer, seemingly intuitive understanding of morality and the true 
purpose of erecting civil government in the first place: see MS Locke c.33, f. 11 (25 March 1679). 
90 Shanks, Authority Figures, SZKRRIIHUVDSHUFHSWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSXUSRVHRI/RFNH·VJURWHVTXHDQGIDEXORXV
tableaux. 
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(YHQPRUHVWDUWOLQJKRZHYHU LV/RFNH·VGHSLFWLRQRIWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI&KULVWLDQLW\IRUWKHPRral 
UHJXODWLRQRIWKRVHVRFLHWLHVZKLFKKDGHPEUDFHGWKHWUXHIDLWK$IWHUDOO/RFNH·VPRUDOWKHRORJ\ZDV
predicated upon the claim that gospel Christianity had revealed what human reason had attempted, but 
VWUXJJOHG WR LGHQWLI\ WKH ¶WUXHJURXQG·RIPRUDOREOLJDWLRQ LQ*RG·VZLOODQGFRPPDQGHQIRUFHGE\
His eternal sanctions. It showed, in other words, why those actions which men nonetheless performed 
because they found it pleasurable to do so (thereby securing the good opinion of others) possessed a 
genuinely moral quality, and why all of mankind were duty-bound to perform them. Revealed 
Christianity, then, did noW FRQWUDGLFW UHDVRQ KHQFH LWV ¶UHDVRQDEOHQHVV·) even as it enlarged upon its 
insights to provide what reason alone FRXOG QRW KHQFH LWV ¶QHFHVVLW\· RC, 191-201). The Christian 
revelation had in theory perfected mankind·VPRUDONQRZOHGJHDQGVWUHQJWKHQHGWKHLUPRWLYHVWROLYH
righteously given its promise of salvation (EHU 2.21.60). It was for this reason that Locke repeatedly 
declared that mHQ·VQDWXUDOIDFXOWLHVSURSHUO\HPSOR\HGZHUH¶VXIILFLHQW·RU¶DGHTXDWH·WROHDGWKHPWR
the performance of their duties ² even if it took revelation fully to enlighten them as to why they ought to 
GRVR<HWRQ/RFNH·VGHHSO\SDUDGR[LFDO DFFRXQW WKHDGoption of Christianity as a national religion 
had to a great extent subverted the very motives which had, prior to (or in the absence of) revelation, 
led men to behave in ways broadly consistent with the moral law. Moral knowledge had, it seemed, 
undermined moral practice. 
/RFNH·V FODLP WKDW properly-regulated heathen societies, and pre-political society in the Treatises, had 
developed LQZD\VEURDGO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWK¶WKHWUXH%RXQGDULHVRIWKH/DZRI1DWXUH·VWRRGLQPDUNHG
FRQWUDVWWR¶WKHVFKLVPVVHSDUDtions, contentions, animosities, quarrels, blood and butchery, and all the 
WUDLQ RI PLVFKLHIV ZKLFK KDYH VR ORQJ KDUDVVHG DQG GHIDPHG &KULVWLDQLW\·91 This raised the vexed 
TXHVWLRQ RI ¶KRZ LW FRPHV WR SDVV WKDW WKH &KULVWLDQ UHOLJLRQ KDWK PDGH PRUH IDFWLRns, wars, and 
GLVWXUEDQFHV LQ FLYLO VRFLHW\ WKDQ DQ\RWKHU·92 In his writings on toleration, Locke made it clear that 
Christianity as it had been practiced in the world had subverted the natural (providential) harmony that 
                                                          
91 Second Vindication, p. 358. 
92 ¶(VVD\FRQFHUQLQJ7ROHUDWLRQ·, p. 209. 
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ought to exist between human and divine law. It was for this reason that Locke recognised the 
superficial plausibility ² though not the truth ² of the GLVTXLHWLQJ VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW ¶WUXO\ WKH&KULVWLDQ
religion is the worst of all religions, and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person, nor 
WROHUDWHGE\DQ\FRPPRQZHDOWK·93 Why had the historical consequences been so catastrophic for those 
societies which professed to follow Christ, and thereby to advance the cause of true religion and 
morality? Locke was adamant that the fault lay with man, not Christ, whose teachings had been 
shamelessly and wilfully subverted: ¶)DUEHLWIURPDQ\RQHWRWKLQN&KULVWWKHDXWKRURIWKRVHGLVRUGHUV
RUWKDWVXFKIDWDOPLVFKLHIVDUHWKHFRQVHTXHQFHRIKLVGRFWULQHWKRXJKWKH\KDYHJURZQXSZLWKLW·.94  
As we have seen, for Locke it was crucial that the two manmade laws ² ¶Civil Law·DQGWKH ¶/DZRI
Reputation· ² continued to be guided by temporal utility. Here, the language of political justification 
mattered. Insofar as the civil law enforced moral precepts and practices, it legitimately did so purely and 
unequivocally on account of their observable public utility, not their speculative truth.95 This was a 
point laboured by Locke, even as he recognised that it might (once again) VHHP ¶VWUDQJH· WR KLV 
contemporary reader. 7KHPDJLVWUDWHRXJKW¶WRKDYHDJUHDWFDUHWKDWQRVXFKODZVEHPDGHQRVXFK
restraints established for any other reason but because the necessity of the state and the welfare of the 
SHRSOHFDOOHGIRUWKHP· /RFNHDUJXHGWKDW ¶WKH ODw-maker hath nothing to do with moral virtues and 
YLFHV· ¶WKHPDJLVWUDWHFRPPDQGVQRWWKHSUDFWLFHRIYLUWXHVEHFDXVHWKH\DUHYLUWXHV [«] but because 
they are the advantages of man with man, and most of them the strong ties and bonds of society, which 
caQQRWEHORRVHQHGZLWKRXWVKDWWHULQJWKHZKROHIUDPH·96 If the magistrate behaved as Locke argued he 
ought, his laws would invariably build upon and reinforce the ideas of virtue and vice which had 
similarly developed within his society according to public utility. The sanctions of civil law would 
                                                          
93 A Letter concerning Toleration (1689), in Political Writings, p. 431. 
94  MS Film 77, pp. 125, 270-71 (c. 1675). 
95  Locke conceded that tKHUHZDVRQH ¶KHDWKHQSROLW\·ZKLFKhad KDGEHHQ LQVWLWXWHGIRUD UDWKHUGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVH ¶WKH
preservation and propagation of true religiRQ·. This was Mosaic Israel, a theocracy under the sovereignty of the 
Almighty: Letter concerning Toleration, pp. 418-9. 
96  ¶(VVD\FRQFHUQLQJ7ROHUDWLRQ·Sp. 193-5 (italics added). 
 LOCKE ON REPUTATION  
30 
 
complement rather than compete with those of praise and blame; and both would encourage men to 
conduct themselves in ways which conduced to the common good of the community.  
Locke nonetheless recognised the possibLOLW\ WKDW WKH ¶/DZRIReputation·PLJKWRQRFFDVLRQEHFRPH
detached from the criterion of public utility. In the Second Treatise, Locke described this in terms of a 
VHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQ¶&XVWRP·DQG¶5HDVRQ·&XVWRPDU\SUDFWLFHVDQGLGHDVKDGWKHLURULJLQs in what was 
IRXQGXVHIXOWRWKHFRPPXQLW\/RFNHH[SODLQHG<HW¶7KLQJVRIWKLV:RUOGDUHLQVRFRQVWDQWD)OX[
WKDWQRWKLQJUHPDLQV ORQJ LQ WKHVDPH6WDWH·$SUDFWLFHZKLFKPD\RQFHKDYHEHHQEHQHILFLDOPLJKW
now prove harmful. This explains why, in the Second Treatise, Locke accords extensive powers of 
SUHURJDWLYH WR WKH PDJLVWUDWH ¶3ULYDWH ,QWHUHVW RIWHQ NHHSLQJ XS &XVWRPV DQG 3ULYLOHJHV ZKHQ WKH
UHDVRQVRIWKHPDUHFHDVHG·LWPLJKWUHTXLUHDQDFWRIH[HFXWLYHSUHURJDWLYHWRRYHUULGHDFRQYHQWLRQto 
ZKLFK FRPPRQRSLQLRQ UHPDLQHG LUUDWLRQDOO\ DWWDFKHG ¶Prerogative being nothing, but a Power in the 
3ULQFHWRSURYLGHIRUWKHSXEOLFNJRRG·TT, II: §156-7). This also explains why Locke denied that the 
civil magistrate was in all cases beholden to the customary, fundamental laws of the realm in the 
manner argued by many Whig legal theorists, who constructed their arguments against the Crown on 
WKHEDVLVRI(QJODQG·VDQFLHQWFRQVWLWXWLRQ97 Manmade laws, for Locke, had to evolve according to the 
contingent demands of public utility: it was their convenience, rather than their antiquity, which made 
the ODZVZKLFKUHJXODWHGSROLWLFDODQGUHOLJLRXVVRFLHWLHVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK¶UHDVRQ·TT, II: §103; I: 57-8). 
,IODZVZHUH¶UHDVRQDEOH·LQWKLVVHQVHWKH\ZHUHOLNHO\WREHLQFRQIRUPLW\ZLWK*RG·VJHQHUDOZLOODQG
design, and authoritative as a consequence.98 
                                                          
97  )RU /RFNH·V QRWDEOH ODFN RI HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK DQFLHQW FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP see -*$ 3RFRFN ¶1HJDWLYH DQG 3RVLWLYH
$VSHFWV RI /RFNH·V 3ODFH LQ (LJKWHHQWK-&HQWXU\ 'LVFRXUVH· LQ 03 7KRPSVRQ HG John Locke und Immanuel Kant: 
Historische Rezeption und Gegenwärtige Relevanz (Berlin, 1991), pp. 45-61; M.P. Thompson ¶6LJQLILFDQt SLOHQFHV LQ/RFNH·V
Two Treatises: Constitutional History, Contract and LDZ·Historical Journal, 31:2 (1988), pp. 275-94; and Tully, Discourse on 
Property, pp. 33-54. Harris makes a similar point, but with an important qualification: it is not inconceivable that Locke 
discussed fundamental law in the lost section of the First Treatise (Mind of Locke, p. 202). Even if true, however, Locke 
clearly thought that his argument as presented in the published Treatises was adequate as it stood.   
98  Locke made much the same point in his ¶'HIHQFH RI 1RQFRQIRUPLW\· F-2) regarding religious societies, where 
Christ had left it to his followers to determine the particular form of government and rules of worship which they felt 
most conducive to the ends for which such societies were established (edification, public worship, and the propagation 
of Gospel truth). As circumstances changed over historical time, so too might the consequences of these forms and 
rules: what might once have been beneficial might have becoPHKDUPIXO$¶JUHDWUHVSHFWIRUWKHILUVWHVWDEOLVKHUVRIDQ\
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A greater danger, however, was that the civil magistrate would similarly cease to adopt the common 
temporal interest of his citizens as his guide ² a departure IURP¶KHDWKHQSROLWLFV·ZKLFK&KULVWKDG in 
no sense countenanced. Locke laboured the point that Christianity had not enjoined the magistrate to 
LQFXOFDWH¶WUXH·PRUDODQGUHOLJLRXVSULQFLSOHVLQKLVVXEMHFWV Christ had ¶LQVWLWXWHGQRFRPPRQZHDOWK·
anGKLVODZ¶KDWKQRWDWDOOPHGGOHG·ZLWKWKH¶DQFLHQWIRUPVRIJRYHUQPHQW·WKDWKDGEHHQUHWDLQHGE\
WKRVH¶FLWLHVDQGNLQJGRPVWKDWKDYHHPEUDFHGWKHIDLWKRI&KULVW·7KHUHZDVLQVKRUW¶QRVXFKWKLQJ
XQGHUWKH*RVSHODVD&KULVWLDQFRPPRQZHDOWK·, and no need for Christianity to interfere with either 
WKH ¶/DZRIReputation·RU WKH ¶Civil /DZ·.99 Obedience to Christ did not, and could not, demand that 
men break the compacts they had naturally formed with one another and with the civil magistrate in 
order to pursue their worldly happiness (and thereby to perform, if unknowingly, their duties under 
natural law). Yet this depended upon the sovereign continuing to concern himself solely with the 
temporal happiness and prosperity of his society. In a Christian age, the birth of the chimerical concept 
RIWKH¶&KULVWLDQFRPPRQZHDOWK·LQGLFDWHGKRZ&KULVW·VWHDFKLQJRQWKLVSRLQWKDGEHHQV\VWHPDWLFDOO\
disregarded. This in large part explained the central paradox identified by Locke ² why the harmony 
between the three ¶/DZV·KDGEHHQVXEYHUWHGmost egregiously in Christian polities WKHVH¶GLVRUGHUV·KDG
¶JURZQXSZLWK·&KULVWLDQLW\.100  
:LWK&RQVWDQWLQH·VHQGRUVHPHQWRIDVSHFLILFDOO\GRFWULQDO7ULQLWDULDQIRUPRI&KULVWLDQLW\DW1LFDHD
(325 AD), the civil magistrate, misled by philosopher-priests, considered it essential to public happiness 
that men possess ¶RUWKRGR[· speculative opinions.101 5HOLJLRQDQGYLUWXHKDGEHFRPH ¶D%XVLQHVVHRI
6WDWH· WUXWK WRRN WKHSODFHRIXWLOLW\DQGDEVWUDFW VSHFXODWLRQUHSODFHG experience and observation.102 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
WKLQJ· SUHFOXGHG WKH UH-DGMXVWPHQW RI PHDQV WR HQGV ZKLFK ZDV SHULRGLFDOO\ QHFHVVDU\ DQG ¶OHDYHV QR URRP IRU
LPSURYHPHQW· MS Locke c.34, pp. 34-5. For the character of this document ² the mosW LPSRUWDQW RI /RFNH·V
manuscripts to remain unpublished ² see T. 6WDQWRQ¶7KH1DPHDQG1DWXUHRI/RFNH·V´'HIHQFHRI1RQFRQIRUPLW\µ·
Locke Studies, 6 (2006), pp. 143-72.   
99 Letter concerning Toleration, pp. 418-19. Locke laboured the same point in the Reasonableness (RC 113-21). 
100  MS Film 77, pp. 125, 270-71 (c. 1675). 
101  7KH HW\PRORJ\ RI ¶RUWKRGR[· LWVHOI KHOSV WR H[SODLQ /RFNH·V YHKHPHQW KRVWLOLW\ WR WKH FRQFHSW DV LW PDNHV D FODLP
regarding speculative truth: from ݷƱƨƼƲ, orthos ¶ULJKW·¶WUXH·¶VWUDLJKW·DQGƤƼƮơ, doxa ¶RSLQLRQ·RU¶EHOLHI·  
102 6HH /RFNH·V FRPPHQW LQ WKH ¶'HIHQFH RI 1RQFRQIRUPLW\· WKDW ¶>RQFH@ WKH WHPSRUDO DXWKRULW\ FDPH WR EH PL[W ZLWK
Ecc[llesiast]ecall jurisdiction, & force was made use of contrary to the nature of the thing to make men Christians, or of 
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0HQ·VWHPSRUDOKDSSLQHVVWKHSXUVXLWRIZKLFKWKHFLYLOPDJLVWUDWHOHJLWLPDWHO\VRXJKWWRIDFLOLWDWHZDV
conflated with their eternal happiness, which was the concern of the individual alone. This had made it 
possible for civil magistrates, including Charles II and James II, to be misled into acts that were 
¶FRQWUDU\WRWKHHQGIRUZKLFK>FLYLOVRFLHWLHV@ZHUHFRQVWLWXWHG· (T II: §227). Supported by ecclesiastics 
² the other-worldly character of whose motives was questionable ² the magistrate had employed the 
threat of divine and civil sanctions in order to compel men to conform to particular speculative 
precepts, in religion as in morality. ,W ZDV RQ DFFRXQW RI WKLV GLVDVWURXV ¶FRQIRXQGLQJ· RI ¶WHPSRUDOO
DXWKRULW\· ZLWK ¶HFFOHVLDVWLFDO MXULVGLFWLRQ· LQ QDNHG GHILDQFH RI &KULVW·V WHDFKLQJ WKDW ¶WKH &KULVWLDQ
UHOLJLRQLVDFFXVHGRIVRPDQ\GLVRUGHUVLQWKHZRUOG·103  
The consequences for the moral regulation of communities of this fundamental misunderstanding of 
the purpose and end of civil authority were profound and deleterious. In a lengthy passage in the 
Epistola, Locke discussed them with reference to the abject practices of the Spanish in the New World. 
He could just as well have been referring to the transition between tolerant heathen Rome and that of 
the Christian emperors (a narrative later offered, in a rather different key, by Edward Gibbon): 
An inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a pagan 
country. These foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would 
succour them with the necessaries of life. Those necessaries are given them; habitations are 
granted; and they all join together and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion 
by this means takes root in that country, and spreads itself; but does not suddenly grow the 
strongest. While things are in this condition, peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are 
preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their 
party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights 
to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated. And unless these innocent pagans, strict observers of the 
rules of equity and of the law of nature, and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say unless they 
will forsake their ancient religion, and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out 
of the lands and possessions of their forefathers, and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then at last 
it appears what zeal for the Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
this or that Church whether they would or no, Religion became a Businesse of 6WDWH·06/RFNHFS/RFNH·V
private papers are replete with negative references to the Constantinian moment: for two examples, see MS Locke c.27, 
fos. 29 (1674) and 32-3 (1675). 7KHGLVDVWURXVFRQVHTXHQFHVRI&RQVWDQWLQH·VKHDGVKLSRIWKHFKXUFKZHUHH[SORUHGE\
PDQ\ RI /RFNH·V FRQWHPSRUDULHV DQG IULHQGV ZKR DGYRFDWHG WROHUDWLRQ QRW OHDVW 3KLOOLS YRQ /LPERUFK DQG -HDQ /H
Clerc: J. Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 618-46. 
103 MS Locke c.34, p. 101 (1681-2).  
 LOCKE ON REPUTATION  
33 
 
and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves as a cloak to 
covetousness, rapine, and ambition.104 
This passage contains a number of important assumptions, germane to our discussion but in need of 
XQSDFNLQJ )LUVW WKH ¶LQQRFHQW SDJDQV· DUH ¶strict observers of the rules of equity and of the law of 
QDWXUH·WKLVLVDPRUHIRUFHIXOUHFDSLWXODWLRQRIWKHFODLPLQWKe Essay that heathen societies developed 
moral ideas broadly in conformity with the law of nature (EHU, 2.28.11). They did so because both of 
the laws which regulated their society ² WKH ¶/DZ RI Reputation· DQG WKH rudimentary ¶Civil LDZ· ² 
developed according to the dictates of observable public utility.105 This is despite the fact that these 
pagans had no rational grasp RIWKHWUXHJURXQGVRIPRUDOLW\¶Divine /DZ·as lying in the will of a God, 
to whose existence and providential plan for mankind their natural faculties had not yet led them. With 
WKH DGYHQW RI VXSSRVHGO\ &KULVWLDQ PDJLVWUDF\ ¶WKH SUHWHQFH RI UHOLJLRQ· LQ VKDUS FRQWUDVW WKH
temporal well-being of the community had been sacrificed at the altar RI HWHUQDO EOLVV ¶WKH FDUH RI
VRXOV·to an extent previously unimaginable. The concern of the Christian magistrate to enforce virtue 
as virtue, and religious precepts as true, saw heterodoxy presented as a more egregious crime than theft 
or even murder, which could be justified in the name of extirpating idolatry.106  
This, Locke argued, had inevitably UHVXOWHG LQ WKH VXEYHUVLRQ RI WKH ¶/DZ RI Reputation· $V /RFNH·V
HGXFDWLRQDOZULWLQJVVXJJHVWHGPHQ·VGHVLUHIRUSUDLVHDQGDYHUVLRQWREODPHUHQGHUHGWKHPPDOOHDEOH
in ways which could habituate them in vicious habits as easily as virtuous ones. In late republican 
Rome, the ¶SDJDQFRXQWU\·LQWKHEpistola, and the early stages of society in the Second Treatise, the desire 
for praise and aversion to blame had largely led men to conduct themselves in ways which benefited the 
society of which they were members. This showed how the desire for reputation was, like a respect for 
RQH·V parents DQ LQHIIDFHDEOH SDUW RI PDQ·V GLYLQHO\-created nature, and hence served a providential 
purpose: both, working as they ought, DWWHVWHG WR*RG·V ¶(QGV· and goodness in creating man as He 
                                                          
104 Letter concerning Toleration, pp. 416-17 (italics added). 
105 As in the case of the native Canadians discussed in MS Locke c.33, f. 11 (25 March 1679). 
106  Again, the etymology is revealing: from ݌ƴƥƱƯ, hetero ¶RWKHU·DQG ƤƼƮơ, doxa ¶RSLQLRQ·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had. :LWKWKHHPHUJHQFHRIFRPPRQZHDOWKVGHYRWHGWRWKHLQFXOFDWLRQRI¶WUXH·UHOLJLRQ however, this 
had ceased to be the case. Men were encouraged to esteem their neighbours less on account of their 
contribution to the common good and more on the basis of their professed speculative principles. A 
desire for esteem encouraged men to conform to social norms ² which explained why LQ ¶&KULVWLDQ
FRPPRQZHDOWKV· intolerance and the inhumane acts to which it led could have become so ubiquitous, 
and men reduced below the level of beasts.107  
+HUH/RFNH·V DFFRXQW LVRQFH DJDLQGLDPHWULFDOO\RSSRVHG WR+REEHV·s. In Leviathan, Hobbes argued 
that the sovereign was both rex et sacerdos.108 In making this case he had recourse to a medical metaphor, 
in a chapter entitled ¶2ID&KULVWLDQ&RPPRQZHDOWK· ² precisely the political entity the legitimacy of 
which Locke denied: ¶)RULWLVZLWKWKHP\VWHULHVRIRXU5HOLJLRQDVZLWKZKROVRPHSLOOVIRUWKHVLFN
which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again 
ZLWKRXWHIIHFW·.109 /RFNHLQYHUWHG+REEHV·s metaphor, the better to establish the absolute nature of the 
conceptual distinction between politics and religion which Hobbes had elided. Men LQ ¶&KULVWLDQ
FRPPRQZHDOWKV· ZHUH IRUFHG WR ¶VZDOORZGRZQ2SLQLRQV DV VLOO\3HRSOHGR(PSLULFN3LOOVZLWKRXW
knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe they will do 
the Cure: but in this, they are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse 
VZDOORZLQJZKDWSHUKDSVWKH\KDGUDWKHUOHWDORQH· As a result of this disastrous confusion between the 
civil and the sacred, men in professedly Christian societies grew XS¶cooped in close, by the Laws· (EHU 
4.20.4).110 They were prevented from developing their moral ideas naturally: that is, on the basis of what 
was found in practice to further the temporal happiness both of themselves and of the society in which 
they lived. 
                                                          
107  6HHQ LQ WKLV OLJKW 0DUWKD 1XVVEDXP·V FODLP WKDW /RFNH GLG QRW SRVVHVV HYHQ D EDVLF JUDVS RI PRUDO SV\FKRORJ\ DV
DWWHVWHG E\ KLV FRPSOHWH ODFN RI LQWHUHVW LQ ¶WKH SV\FKRORJLFDO XQGHUSLQQLQJV RI LQWoleUDQFH· VHHPV FXULRXV LQGHHG 
¶5DGLFDO(YLOLQWKH/RFNHDQ6WDWH7KH1HJOHFWRIWKH3ROLWLFDO(PRWLRQV·Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3:2 (2006), pp. 159-
78 (on p. 162). 
108  J. Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 203-28. 
109 Leviathan, iii, 3.32, p. 578. 
110  7KLVSDVVDJHZDVRQFHDJDLQDOUHDG\ZULWWHQE\¶'UDIW$·LQDrafts for the Essay, §39, p. 69. 
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In properly-regulated communities, even those who were not inclined to the act of philosophy might 
still possess ideas of virtue and vice which were broadly consistent with truth, because they acquired 
those ideas through their participation in communities regulated by the dictates of public utility. Locke 
was supremely confident that heathens, once led by their faculties to an idea of God and subsequently 
introduced to the Gospels without coercion or impediment, might recognise the latter to speak of 
truths which accorded with their moral ideas even as they enlarged upon them (exponentially, in some 
cases).111 Locke was no consequentialist: LIDQDFWLRQSURYHGXVHIXO LQDGYDQFLQJPDQNLQG·VFROOHFWLYH
interests ² VXFKDVWKHFDUHDQGSUHVHUYDWLRQRIRQH·VFKLOGUHQRUDUHVSHFWIRUDQRWKHU·VSURSHUW\DQG
livelihood ² it was because God had ordered the world in such a way that His commands through 
revelation (go forth and multiply; replenish the earth; do unto others) had already recommended 
themselves to men on account of their utility. They were true and obligatory not because they were 
XVHIXORUGHVLUDEOHEXWEHFDXVHWKH\UHSUHVHQWHG*RG·VZLOODQGFRPPDQGDVWKH6FULSWXUHVPDGHSODLQ 
to all who read them.112 Alerting men to its true grounds and sanctions, &KULVW·V WHDFKLQJ PHUHO\
¶HQIRUFHVPRUDOLW\ WKHVWURQJHU·DQGRIIHUHG additional (and compelling) incentives to live righteously 
beyond the pleasure derived from a good reputation. )RU WKH VRFLDOLVHG LQGLYLGXDO KDELWXDWHG LQ ¶WKH
solid pleasures of knowlHGJHDQGUHSXWDWLRQ·WKH6FULSWXUHVVLPSO\UHYHDOHGKRZ¶conscience, reason and 
SOHDVXUHJRWRJHWKHU·113  
+HUH/RFNH·VSRVLWLRQVWDQGVLQPDUNHGDQGUHYHDOLQJFRQWUDVWWRWKDWRIDQRWKHUOHDGLQJSURSRQHQWRI
religious toleration in the 1680s: Pierre Bayle.114 In his Pensées Diverses sur la Comète (1680; 1683), Bayle 
IDPRXVO\GHFODUHGWKDWDWKHLVWVFRXOGOHDGPRUDO OLYHV%D\OH·VUHDVRQLQJZDVVLPLODUWR1LFROH·V LQKLV
                                                          
111  6HHWKHUHPDUNLQWKH¶)XQGDPHQWDO&RQVWLWXWLRQVRI&DUROLQD·² which Locke probably had a hand in drafting ² 
WKDWWKHQDWLYHSDJDQVVKRXOGEHOHIWWR¶DFTXDLQWWKHPVHOYHVZLWKWKHWUXWKDQGUHDVRQDEOHQHVV·RIWKH*RVSHOs without 
impediment or coercion: Political Writings, p. 229. For a discussion of Lockean toleration as expressive of a commitment 
to Christian PLVVLRQ DQG XQGHUSLQQHG E\ /RFNH·V unshakeable FRQILGHQFH WKDW ¶within the setting of free and open 
LQWHOOHFWXDO H[FKDQJH WKH *RVSHO·V WUXWK DQG EHDXW\ ZRXOG LQH[RUDEO\ WULXPSK·, see J. 7XUQHU ¶-RKQ /RFNH &KULstian 
0LVVLRQDQG&RORQLDO$PHULFD·Modern Intellectual History, 8:2 (2011), pp. 267-97 (on p. 295). 
112  Tully, Discourse on Property, pp. 46-7, puts this point well. 
113  MS Locke c.42B, p. 224 (1692: italics added). 
114  2Q/RFNH·VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK%D\OHVHe Harris, Mind of Locke, pp.190-1, 280-9; Marshall, Early Enlightenment Culture, pp. 
618-719; and P. Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton, 2003), pp. 240-88. 
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Essais: terrestrial pressures ² a concern for reputation, and the sanctions of civil law ² were sufficient to 
explain moral conduct, given the extent of post-lapsarian human depravity. This implied that morality 
could be discussed in an entirely secular idiom.115 On one level, Locke was willing to agree: after all, his 
invocation of pagan (and even atheist) nations suggested that tolerable moral conduct was possible in 
the absence of true (or any) religious knowledge. Yet for Locke this very fact attested to divine wisdom, 
goodness and design. God ensured that worldly utility and divine truth existed in a harmonious 
relationship, even as mankind had repeatedly disturbed this harmony. Bayle had terminated his 
enquiries too soon. By asking the further question of why men were drawn to the useful and agreeable, 
one would recognise that human nature as it revealed itself in society attested to the existence and 
JRRGQHVV RI D GLYLQH OHJLVODWRU DQG HPERGLHG +LV ¶(QGV· IRU PDQNLQG116 It was for this reason that 
atheists who denied a priori the existence of God ² DVRSSRVHGWR¶LQQRFHQW3DJDQV·RUWKRVHZKR had 
yet to arrive at any idea of divinity ² were not to be tolerated.117 Such speculative atheists ruled out the 
possibility or necessity of employing their God-given natural faculties in the manner intended by their 
Creator: to understand the true foundatiRQRIWKHLUPRUDOGXWLHVLQ*RG·VZLOODQGFRPPDQGDQGIRU
&KULVWLDQV WR UHFRJQLVH WKH PRVW FRPSHOOLQJ LQFHQWLYH WR SHUIRUP WKHP LQ &KULVW·V RIIHU RI
righteousness. Reason and revelation, knowledge and faith, utility and truth were for Locke not 
separated by a chasm, as for Bayle or Nicole WKH\ OD\ RQ D FRQWLQXXP RQ DFFRXQW RI *RG·V
providential design and ongoing care of His creatures.118 7KH VWHS IURP SHUIRUPLQJ RQH·V GXWLHV
because one found them useful and agreeable, to doing so from a just understanding of oneself as 
*RG·V¶3URSHUW\·QHHGQRWEHDSDUWLFXODUO\WURXEOLQJRQH 
                                                          
115  )RU WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI %D\OH·V FODLP IRU WKH EURDGHU GHYHORpment of eighteenth-century moral philosophy, see J. 
Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge, 2005). 
116  /RFNH·V GLYLQH WHOHRORJ\ WDNHQ DV D ZKROH, one might argue, reflects or even relies upon his lack of interest in³or 
strenuous avoidance of³those thorny problems of theodicy which Bayle mined exhaustively and with evident relish.  
117  ¶(VVD\ FRQFHUQLQJ 7ROHUDWLRQ· S  Letter concerning Toleration S  2Q /RFNH·V GLVWLQFWLRQ QRZKHUH H[SUHVVHG
explicitly iQ WKHVH WHUPV EHWZHHQ LQQRFHQW DQG VSHFXODWLYH DWKHLVP VHH -. 1XPDR ¶/RFNH RQ $WKHLVP· History of 
Political Thought, 34:2 (2013), pp. 252-72. 
118  R. $VKFUDIW ¶)DLWK DQG .QRZOHGJH LQ /RFNH·V 3KLORVRSK\· LQ -: <ROWRQ HG John Locke: Problems and Perspectives 
(Cambridge, 1969), pp. 194-223. 
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This, however, had ceased to be the case. The ¶)DWKHURU6FKRROPDVWHU WKH3DUVRQRI WKH3DULVKRU
VXFK D 5HYHUHQG 'RFWRU· now exercised a tyrannical authority over men, the consequence of the 
&KULVWLDQ PDJLVWUDWH·V HUURQHRXV FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW WKH ZHOO-being of the commonwealth in some sense 
GHSHQGHG XSRQ WUXH VSHFXODWLYH RSLQLRQV 7KHVH PHQ ¶FUDP WKHLU 7HQHWV GRZQ DOO 0HQ·V 7KURDWV
whom they can get into their Power, without permitting them to examine their Truth or Falsehood; and 
ZLOOQRWOHW7UXWKKDYHIDLUSOD\LQWKH:RUOGQRU0HQWKH/LEHUW\WRVHDUFKDIWHULW·EHU 4.3.20). The 
LQGLYLGXDO LQ WKH PRGHUQ DJH ZDV QRW DOORZHG WR ¶VHH ZKDW KH KLPVHOI FDQ VLQFHUHO\ VHDUFKLQJ Dfter 
WUXWKILQGRXW·119 ,Q¶&KULVWLDQFRPPRQZHDOWKV·the forced and illegitimate intrusion of philosophical 
and political theology into the public square KDGSRVLWLYHO\¶REVFXUHGDQGSHUSOH[HGWKHPDWHULDO7UXWKV
RI/DZDQG'LYLQLW\·WKDW, in a heathen age, even the illiterate ¶PHFKDQLFN· RU¶SORXJKPDQ·KDGLQVRPH
sense understood (EHU 3.10.8).120 This process had been expedited by the culture as well as ideology 
of jure divino PRQDUFKLVPWKH¶OX[XU\RIWKH&RXUWV·VHWDSHUQLFLRXVH[DPSOHIRU¶LQIHULRUJUDQGHHV·WR
LPLWDWHHVWHHPLQJ¶LGOHDQGXVHOHVVHPSOR\PHQWV·DQGEULQJLQJ¶KRQHVWODERXULQXVHIXODQGPHFKDQLFDO
DUWVZKROO\LQWRGLVJUDFH·121 Idle speculation had taken the place of useful empirical observation in all 
areas of life. 
The corruption of the ¶/DZRIReputation·, itself a consequence of this fundamental misunderstanding of 
the proper end and jurisdiction of political authority, had serious implications for what both the 
magistrate and the philosopher-priest now claimed jointly to superintend: WKH FDUH RI WKH &KULVWLDQ·V
soul. Only if individuals were permitted to cultivate their natural faculties without undue (and 
illegitimate) impediment might they be in a position truly to apprehend both the reasonableness and 
necessity of the Christian revelation. &KULVW·VUHYHODWLRQZDV¶UHDVRQDEOH·LQSDUWEHFDXVHLWEXLOWXSRQ
the ideas of what was good and ill which men ought to have acquired in societies guided by the dictates 
RI WHPSRUDO XWLOLW\ ,W ZDV ¶QHFHVVDU\· EHFDXVH Christ performed what philosophers had not, by 
                                                          
119 Conduct of the Understanding, p. 382. 
120  A point made particularly strongly by Locke in his later discussion of error: MS Film 77, pp. 320-21 (1698). 
121  MS Film 77, p. 310 (1693). 
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explaining in a language all could understand WKH ¶WUXHJURXQG·DQGREOLJDWRU\FKDUDFWHURI virtue and 
vice DV*RG·VOHJLVODWLYHZLOODQGFRPPDQG Yet this harmony between virtue and duty ² and between 
PDQNLQG·V FROOHFWLYH SXUVXLW RI KDSSLQHVV LQ WKLV ZRUOG DQG &KULVW·V WHUPV IRU HQWUDQFH LQWR +LV
kingdom ² had been interrupted, and hence obscured from view, in Christian commonwealths. It was 
for this reason that, in all of his writings, Locke proposed a reformation in political, moral and religious 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ FRUUHFWLQJ WKH HUURUV ZKLFK KDG EHHQ SHUSHWXDWHG IROORZLQJ &KULVW·V DSSHDUDQFH122 
/RFNH·VXOWLPDWHDLPDVKHVWDWHGDWWKHRXWVHWRIWKH(VVD\ZDVWRUHPRYHWKH¶some of the rubbish, that 
lies in the way to Knowledge· ² especially knowledge of PDQNLQG·V ¶JUHDW &RQFHUQPHQWV· RI PRUDOLW\
religion and justice (EHU, 2.23.12).123 This detritus now prevented men from recognising the 
providential harmony which ought to exist between the three laws which regulated human societies, 
and between the dictates of communal utility and the demands of moral duty. Locke was far from 
optimistic that his endeavour would be sufficient to turn the tide. 
IV 
7KLVDUWLFOHVXJJHVWVWKDW/RFNH·VVRFLDO and moral thought is both more compelling and more troubling 
than is often appreciated. The desire for esteem provided a means of conceptualising how, in society, 
men became sociable creatures and moral agents, notwithstanding the limited reach of their natural 
faculties. Almost all felt obligated to abide by a shared moral code which expressed a common, 
necessarily contingent, but broadly accurate sense of their collective interest, and most took pleasure in 
living according to it. 7KLV UHSUHVHQWV D VWULNLQJO\ RULJLQDO DVSHFW RI /RFNH·V WKRXJKW 7KH GHVLUH IRr 
approval rendered the individual malleable: a point recognised but regretted by Augustinian moralists 
such as Nicole and Bayle. Locke argued that this indelible feature of human nature was, as with all 
                                                          
122  6HH IRU H[DPSOH/RFNH·V claim in the Treatises WKDW)LOPHUZDV D ¶5HIRUPHU LQ3ROLWLFNV·/RFNH·V RZQREMHFWLYH ZDV
professedly limited to re-HVWDEOLVKLQJ ¶WKH ROG ZD\· RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ SROLWLFDO DXWKRULW\ TT I: §106; II: §6). /RFNH·V
religious apologetic similarly offers to recRYHUWKHWUXHPHDQLQJDQGVLJQLILFDQFHRI&KULVW·VWHDFKLQJV² and hence to re-
establish the true scope, end and jurisdiction of religious societies (churches). 
123  EHU¶(SLVWOHWRWKH5HDGHU·S 
 LOCKE ON REPUTATION  
39 
 
others, no accident, and not in itself a cause for regret. Man had been created in this way, and God did 
nothing in vain.  
The desire for the good opinion of others had, Locke suggested, VHUYHG*RG·VSXUSRVHVE\DFWLQJDVD
PHFKDQLVPZKLFKDOORZHGIRUWKHVROLSVLVWLF+REEHVLDQLQGLYLGXDO·VYLHZRIWKHJRRGand useful to be 
harmonised with those of his neighbours, without the need for ² and theoretically prior to ² the 
instantiation of political authority. The feasibility of pre-SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLW\ZDVHVVHQWLDO WR/RFNH·V
political theory, which conceived of sovereignty as entrusted and revocable. A concern for reputation 
thus enabled Locke to accept, or even to develop further many RI+REEHV·s fundamental premises ² 
his hedonic psychology, nominalism and legislative view of morals ² whilst nonetheless powerfully 
FKDOOHQJLQJ KLV FRQFOXVLRQV 7KH ¶/DZ RI Reputation· partially GLVSODFHG +REEHV·s FLYLO ODZ LQ /RFNH·V
H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH RULJLQV DQG GHYHORSPHQW RI VRFLHW\ 'XH WR /RFNH·V HPSKDVLV RQ WKH GLYLQely-
ordained harmony between these man-made laws and the law of nature, God replaced the sovereign as 
the author of all law, upon whom men were ultimately dependent. To deny this dependence was to 
deny the existence of all law properly so-called, which was the command of a superior (God) who 
legitimately promulgated rules for mankind ZKLFK ZHUH GLVFORVHG WKURXJK ERWK ¶QDWXUDO UHYHODWLRQ·
PHQ·VVHQVHVDQGUHDVRQDQGWKH6FULSWXUHV. It was for this reason that atheists who denied a priori the 
existence of God were a law unto themselves, and had no claim to toleration.124  
9LHZHG IURPD UDWKHUGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYH/RFNH·V LQWHUHVW IURP WKH ODWHUV LQPDQ·VGHVLUH IRU
esteem arguably attests to his increasing recognition of the insuperable difficulties he faced in 
UHVSRQGLQJ WR +REEHV·V FKDOOHQJH /RFNH FOHDUO\ struggled to establish the origins, content and 
REOLJDWRU\FKDUDFWHURIQDWXUDOODZRQWKHEDVLVRIKLV¶QHZZD\RILGHDV·² even as he never retracted 
                                                          
124 ¶7KHRULJLQDO	IRXQGDWLRQRIDOO/DZLVGHSHQGHQF\A dependent intelligent being is under the power & direction & 
dominion of him on whom he depends & must be for the ends appointed him by that superior being. If man were 
independent he could have noe law but his own will, noe end but himself. He would be a god to himself, & the 
satisfaction of his own will the sole measure & end of all his actions·06/RFNHFIc. 1693). 
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his claim that morality was potentially capable of demonstration (EHU 3.11.16-17; 4.3.18-20).125 This 
partially explains the problematic distinction drawn by Locke between moral conduct and moral 
knowledge. Men might agree on a shared code of conduct on the basis of its evident communal utility; 
and, because they considered a good reputation to be essential to their happiness, individuals would 
find that abiding by that code ² and thereby securing the praise of others ² was a source of pleasure. All 
this, Locke maintained, was theoretically possible in the absence of D UDWLRQDO JUDVS RI RQH·V PRUDO
duties under natural law. Crucially, this was also achievable without the need for magisterial imposition, 
thereby undermining the foundational premise upon which Hobbes had erected his political theory. Yet 
having opened up this conceptual gap between moral conduct aQG WUXH PRUDO NQRZOHGJH /RFNH·V
account begged the pressing question of why knowledge of this latter sort was necessary ² not least 
because Locke himself argued that once it had been delivered by Christ in terms all could understand, it 
had paradoxically undermined that which it had been intended to reinforce.  
+HUH 'DZVRQ·V UHFHQW REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW ¶the naturalising figures of the Enlightenment· PLJKW KDYH
¶learned as much as they rejected from their forbears· ² even from Christian deontologists such as 
Locke ² warrants closer consideration.126 It is surely worth remarking that Hume first introduced the 
principle which was crucial to his ethical naturalism ² ¶V\PSDWK\·- in a section of Book II of A Treatise 
of Human Nature (1739-HQWLWOHG¶2IWKH/RYHRI)DPH·&ORVHUHDGHUVRI/RFNH·VEssay would hardly 
KDYH FRQVLGHUHG DV QRYHO +XPH·V RSHQLQJ JDPELW ¶2XU UHSXWDWLRQ RXU FKDUDFWHU RXU QDPH DUH
considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and 
riches; havH OLWWOH LQIOXHQFH ZKHQ QRW VHFRQGHG E\ WKH RSLQLRQV DQG VHQWLPHQWV RI RWKHUV·127 Such 
UHDGHUV ZRXOG GRXEWOHVV KDYH EHHQ UDWKHU PRUH VXUSULVHG E\ +XPH·V subsequent claim that this 
                                                          
125  Just because he had been unable to do so, Locke informed William Molyneux, it did not mean that a superior genius 
might not VXFFHHGZKHUHKHKDGIDLOHG¶7KRXJKE\WKHYLHZ,KDGRIPRUDOLGHDVZKLOVW,ZDVFRQVLGHULQJWKDWVXEMHFW·
/RFNHGHFODUHG¶,WKRXJKW,VDZPRUDOLW\PLJKWEHGHPRQVWUDWLYHO\PDGHRXW\HWZKHWKHU,DPDEOHVRWRPDNHLWRXWLV
another question. Every oQHFRXOGQRWKDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGZKDW0U1HZWRQ·VERRNKDWKVKHZQWREHGHPRQVWUDEOH·
Correspondence of Locke, iv, #1538 (20 Sept. 1692), pp. 522-5. 
126  'DZVRQ¶1DWXUDO5HOLJLRQ·S 
127  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. D.F. Norton & M.J. Norton (2 vols., Oxford, 2007), 2.1.11. 
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inherent quality of human nature was, properly examined, sufficient to explain the origins of moral 
obligation ² ZLWKRXWDQ\QHHGWRLQYRNH/RFNH·Vdivine legislator or +REEHV·V¶PRUWDO*RG·.128 
/RFNH·V HSLVWHPRORJLFDO ZUitings combine a hectoring tone ² men must labour for truth ² with an 
unmistakeable pessimism when it came to the likelihood of them doing so. In part this certainly reflects 
/RFNH·VXQIlattering verdict that most men, particularly those among the wealthy and educated classes, 
were irretrievably lazy. As this article has attempted to show, however, there is more to LRFNH·V
pessimism than this. Precisely because Locke emphasised the irreversible and profound effects of 
society in shaping the individual, he was hardly optimistic when it came to the likelihood of individuals 
remaking and reforming a society which had been corrupted, and the forces of which held them captive. 
Insofar as Locke appealed to the ideal of the atomised and dissociated individual, upon which scholars 
have frequently focused their attentions, he arguably did so less as a way of explaining how society had 
come into being, than as the only means of uncovering ² and perhaps returning it to ² its original, 
providentially-instituted principles. Yet as Locke recognised only too well, the individual, on account of 
*RG·VGHVLJQZDVQeither dissociated nor atomised ² a theme which he explored, and a point which he 
laboured, more powerfully and comprehensively than any of his contemporaries. Along with many of 
/RFNH·VFULWLFVWKHWKLUGHDUORI6KDIWHVEXU\UHFRJQLVHGDQGGHSORUHGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKKLVRQe-time 
WXWRU·VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHRU\RIVRFLDOGHYHORSPHQWVHHPHGWRUHQGHUWKHLQGLYLGXDO the product 
of the forces governing society.129 The neglected DVSHFWVRI/RFNH·VWKLnking recovered in this article ² 
the intersubjective and contingent nature of the moral code which regulates society, the manner in 
ZKLFK*RG·VDWWULEXWHVDQGZLOOPLJKWQRQHWKHOHVVEHHOLFLWHGIURP the analysis of human nature as it 
revealed itself in social settings, and the deeply troubling historical consequences of Christianity ² 
                                                          
128  For further discussion, see T. Stuart-Buttle, From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: Locke to Hume (Oxford: Forthcoming 
2017). 
129  6HH6KDIWHVEXU\·VFODLPWKDW¶DIWHUKDYLQJIRXQGRXWRWKHUVRUWVRIODZV>/RFNH@Zanted a law for fashion and opinion. 
$QGWKLVDFFRUGLQJWRKLPZDVYLUWXHDQGKRQHVW\·6KDIWHVEXU\WR*HQHUDO-DPHV6WDQKRSH1RY LQ%5DQG
(ed.), The Life, Unpublished Letters and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury (New York, 1900; repr. London, 
1992), p. 416. 2Q6KDIWHVEXU\·VUHVSRQVHWR/RFNH, see T. Stuart-Buttle, ¶6KDIWHVEXU\5HFRQVLGHUHG6WRLF(WKLFVDQGWKH
8QUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRI&KULVWLDQLW\·Locke Studies, 15 (2016), pp. 161-211. 
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helped to set the terms of eighteenth-century philosophical debate in ways we are only just beginning to 
appreciate. 
